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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explore the topic of religiously offensive cartoons, taking the attack on
Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 as a starting point. After applying the legal framework and
different legal philosophical justifications for free speech to the Charlie Hebdo cartoons, the
analysis will take a closer look at a similar controversy in Denmark. As in the Danish cartoon
controversy,  analysing  the  broader  socio-political  context  can  provide a  deeper
understanding of  the root causes of the protests following the attack.  Drawing on critical
discourse analysis this thesis investigates the question to what extend the public discourse
on free speech in France after the attack on Charlie Hebdo and the role of French Muslims
in this debate reflect power relations within the French society. Such power relations indeed
manifest themselves in this discourse as it was the official side who started the discourse
and had the power to chose wording, meaning of concepts, the topoi and to define ingroups
and  outgroups.  Societal  inequalities  can  also  be  noticed  through  participation  and
representation of French Muslisms and their interaction to the other groups present in the
discourse. 
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Introduction
 
On 7 January 2015 the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo fell victim to an attack when two
gunmen  stormed  into  their  office,  killing  12  people.1 The  newspaper  is  known  to  be
provocative,  offensive  and insulting,  often sparking outrage,  protests  and occasionally  a
lawsuit initiated by Christian, Muslim or other religious faith organisations on the grounds of
discrimination and defamation of a group because of their religious belief.2 Throughout the
journal’s history the cartoonists and journalists did not spare anyone and ridiculed politicians,
sportsmen, socialites, clerics and religious figures alike. What upset  Muslim communities
around the globe was that Mohammed was not only portrayed, but also ridiculed. This can
be put down to the fact that pictorial portrayal of the prophet are considered an offence in
most interpretations of Islam, let alone satirical portrayals. The principle that injunctions of
one religion, in this case a ban of (satirical) depictions of Mohammad, only apply to believers
is in particular relevant for multi-faith societies as is the French. It is also important to point
out  the  strict  interpretation  of  secularity  in  France  (laïcité)  which  refers  to  an  absolute
separation of religion and state and is characterised in practice by no religious interference
in politics and vice-versa.  
Nevertheless, the Charlie Hebdo controversy raised questions on the lack of tolerance on
the part of ‘ethnic’ French people towards the French Muslim minority and the importance of
respect for each other within multicultural and multi-faith societies in Europe. The attack on
Charlie Hebdo has been widely perceived as an attack on free speech, which is regarded as
one of the core Western values. The aim of this thesis is to explore the controversy that
followed the attack and to discover root causes, as the controversy itself can merely be seen
as a symptom of a wider problem. 
In  this  thesis  literature on legal  frameworks and legal  philosophy will  be discussed  and
applied to religiously offensive cartoons and a similar case in Denmark will be reviewed ]to
see to what extent it can provide more insight into the Charlie Hebdo controversy. It seems
logical  to first  look at the law and the limits prescribed by law in order to determine the
legality of religiously offensive cartoons like the Mohammed cartoons published by Charlie
Hebdo. As from a legal point of view there seems to be little discussion I will subsequently
move  on  to  the  philosophical  debate  around  justifications  of  free  speech.  Religiously
offensive cartoons will be tested using three different perspectives: the argument from truth,
the argument from democracy and the argument from autonomy. The analysis will proceed
with a closer look at the defamation of religions theory, a theory that seeks to protect religion
as  such  against  defamation.  This  theory,  albeit  controversial  itself,  has  received  much
attention in  the  UN system and can  provide  a  different  take  on  the  topic  of  religiously
offensive speech. Then I will take a closer look at a similar controversy that erupted after the
publication of Mohammed cartoons by Jyllands-Posten in Denmark in order to see if and to
what extent conclusions can be drawn from analysis and interpretations of this controversy.
Scholars such as Lagoutte and Holder decided to analyse the broader societal context in
which the cartoons were published and compare it to the power relations within the public
discourse on free speech in Denmark. I use the term discourse as a “formal discussion of a
topic in speech or writing”3 that takes place in the media. Power in this context has to be
1See BBC, “Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror,” 14 January 2015, accessed 11 December 
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237. 
2See BBC, “French satirical paper Charlie Hebdo attacked in Paris,” 2 November 2011, accessed 11 
December 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15550350. 
3See Oxford Living Dictionaries, “discourse”, accessed 11 December 2016, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/discourse. 
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understood as a form of  dominance in a public discourse,  namely the power to choose
topology,  the  meaning  of  concepts,  definitions,  references  (topoi)  or  to  attribute
characteristics to subjects. But these so-called power relations can also be reflected in the
participation and representation of certain actors and groups, their interaction and reaction to
each other. 
The attack on Charlie Hebdo reignited the public debate on free speech in France. This, in
combination with the topicality of the research topic, as little research has been undertaken
on the public discourse on free speech in France after the attack on Charlie Hebdo and the
role  French  Muslims play  in  this  discourse,  leads  me to explore  the  following  research
question:
To what extent  does  the public discourse on free speech in  France after  the attack on
Charlie Hebdo and the role of French Muslims in this debate reflect power relations within
the French society? 
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Methodology
 
In my thesis I use discourse analysis both as a theory as well as a methodological approach.
As a theoretical concept discourse analysis, drawing on a social constructivist point of view,
asserts that social reality is constructed and preserved through discourse.4 Discourse itself
can  be  defined  as  “an  interrelated  set  of  texts,  and  the  practices  of  their  production,
dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being”5. These discourses manifest
themselves in, among others, written texts,  speech, art and icons.6 Social  interactions in
these discourses result in meanings being created and represented, therefore also referred
to  as  'representations'.  Continous  utterance  of  the  same  representations  bring  about
institutionalised  practices  and  people  voicing  the  same  representations  constitute  a
'position'. Both representations and positions can be either prevalent or marginalised in a
discourse.7 This means that if we want to make sense of our social reality we need to study
the discourse constructing this reality. 
As a method discourse analysis is concerned with  deconstructing and decomposing this
discourse by analysing the language employed. Studying language in discourse analysis
seeks to study more than the grammar as it explores how words and sentences are able to
contruct and preserve meaning, connection, relation and objectives. Discourse analysis is
interested  in  examining  the  connection  between  the  constructed  social  reality  and  the
discourse in order to explore the wider social context in which the discourse is embedded.8 
There are various types of discourse analysis. Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy suggest a
grouping into  four  different  approaches  based on  the  interest  of  the  research  in  power
relations  or  the  way  social  reality  is  constructed  (Axis  1)  and  in texts  composing  the
discourse or the broader context the discourse is situated in (Axis 2).9
4 See Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, “What Is Discourse Analysis?” in: Discourse Analysis, ed. 
Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2002), 2.
5 Phillips, What is Discourse Analysis, 3. 
6 See Phillips, What is Discourse Analysis, 3-4. 
7 See Iver B. Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” in: Qualitative Methods in International Relations. A 
Pluralist Guide, ed. Audi Klotz and Deepa Prakash (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 61-62. 
8 See Phillips, What is Discourse Analysis, 5-6; James Paul Gee and Michael Handford, 
“Introduction,” in: The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis, ed. James Paul Gee and 
Michael Handford (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 5.
9 See Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, “The Variety of Discourse Analysis,” in: Discourse Analysis,
ed. Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2002), 19-20. 
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Fig.  1. Framework  for  varieties  of  discourse  analysis.  Graph  from  Nelson  Phillips  and
Cynthia  Hardy,  “The  Variety  of  Discourse  Analysis”,  in:  Discourse  Analysis,  ed.  Nelson
Phillips and Cynthia Hardy (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2002), 21. 
In my thesis I am particularly interested in the wider context the discourse on free speech
after the attack on Charlie Hebdo is situated in and to what extend this discourse reflects
power relations within the French society. Therefore critical discourse analysis (CDA) seems
best  fit  for  purpose for  two  reasons.  First  CDA oriented  research seeks  to  explore  the
connection  between  language  and  power  and  how  language  can  demonstrate  social
hierarchies. Second, CDA is concerned with critically shedding light on the way language is
used to create and maintain these social inequalities.10 By stressing the human nature of
such inequalities critical discourse analysts question their necessity and very existence.11  
In this thesis I will use a 3-step analysis laid out by Senem Aydin-Düzgit a proponent of the
discourse-historical approach, one branch of CDA. The first step constitutes of identifying the
main discourse topics, meaning the main themes. The second step explores what she calls
“discursive strategies” such as the way subjects are framed, which attributes are ascribed to
them, how these qualities are justified and who is the author of these representations. The
third and last step involves the employed linguistic means to implement these discursive
strategies.  Linguistic  means can  be the usage of  “we”  and “they”,  othering,  metaphors,
rhetorical figures, positive or negatives attributes, flag and stigma words, topoi (e.g. topos of
history, of culture, of threat).12
For this discourse analysis 44 article of two main French papers are analysed, representing
the centre-left – Le Monde – and the centre-right – Le Figaro. In addition public statements
from Muslim  faith  organisations,  Union  des  Organisations  Islamique  de  France (UOIF),
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM),  Ennour and  La Maison Islamo-Chrétienne
and the NGO  Mouvement contre le racism et pour l’amitié entre les peoples (MRAP) are
10 See Ruth Wodak, “What CDA is About – A Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its 
Developments”, in: Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2001), 3. 
11 See Norman Fairclough, “Critical discourse analysis”, in: The Routledge Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis, ed. James Paul Gee and Michael Handford (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 10. 
12 See Critical Discourse analysis in analysing EU foreign policy: prospects and challenges, p.358-
359. 
8
included as well as two addresses to the nations and two communiqués representing the
governmental side of the discourse.
Legal Framework
Scope
Freedom  of  expression  as  a  basic  human  right  was  first  laid  down  in  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948. Article 19 reads:
“Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression;  this  right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and  impart  information  and  ideas  through  any  media  and  regardless  of
frontiers.”13
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 affirms this right
(Art 19) as well as the European counterparts, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) (Art 10) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ChFREU)
(Art 11).
The  ECHR additionally  precludes  “[s]tates  from requiring  the  licensing  of  broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises”14 and the ChFREU upholds that “freedom and pluralism of
the media shall be respected”15.
When interpreting the Charter, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held in the
case  Handyside v  United  Kingdom that  “[f]reedom of  expression  constitutes  one  of  the
essential  foundations”  in  a democratic society and that  free speech is “one of  the basic
conditions for its progress and for the development of every man”16. “In a democratic system
the actions or omissions of the Government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of
the legislative and judicial authorities but also of the press and public opinion”, so the Court
in Castells v Spain.17 For the Court there is no distinction “between political discussion and
13U.N. General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
accessed 29 October 2016, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
14Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 
14, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, accessed 29 October 2016, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  
15European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] 
O.J. C 364/01. 
16ECtHR 7 December 1976, Case No. 5493/72, Handyside v The United Kingdom, para 49. See also 
ECtHR 26 April 1979, Case No. 6538/74, The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, para 65; ECtHR 
8 July 1986, Case No. 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, para 41; ECtHR 26 November 1991, Case No. 
13585/88, Observer and Guardian v The United Kingdom, para 59; ECtHR 25 June 1992, Case No. 
13778/88, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland, para 63; ECtHR 7 February 2012, Case No. 39954/08, 
Axel Springer AG v Germany, para 78. 
17ECtHR 23 April 1992, Case No. 11798/85, Castells v Spain, para 46. 
See also ECtHR 18 July 2000, Case No. 26680/95, Şener v Turkey, para 40; ECtHR 24 April 2007 
(Final 24 July 2007), Case No. 7333/06, Lombardo and Others v Malta, para 54; ECtHR 3 April 2012 
(Final 03 July 2012), Case No. 43206/07, Kaperzynski v Poland, para 64. 
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discussion of other matters of public concern”18. As the Convention does not explicitly state
which forms of expression are covered, the Court defines three forms of speech in his case
law: political expression19, commercial speech20 and artistic speech21.
Further, not only the idea itself  but also the way the idea is expressed is covered by the
Convention.22 This  means  that  cartoons  are  a  form  of  expression  covered  by  the
Convention.  Protection  of  freedom  of  speech  does  not  only  refer  to  speech  that  is
“favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population”.23 As many
scholars have pointed out, the fact that cartoons are offensive, cannot per se exclude them
from protection under Article 10.24
The Court has acknowledged the important function of the media in a democratic system25
as a “public watchdog”26, granting that “journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to
a degree of  exaggeration,  or  even provocation.”27 In Radio France v France the ECtHR
made clear  that  this  journalistic  freedom cannot  apply  to the  “dissemination of  incorrect
information”28 however a distinction must be made between expressions claimed to be true
and those being value judgements.29 
18 Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland, para 64. 
19See Castells v Spain, para 42; ECtHR 8 July 1999, Case No. 26682/95, Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), 
para 61; ECtHR 12 July 2001 (Final 12 October 2001), Case No. 29032/95, Feldek v Slovakia, para 
74; ECtHR 3 November 2011 (Final 08 March 2012), Case No. 29459/10, Fratanoló v Hungary, para 
24. 
20See ECtHR 24 February 1994, Case No. 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, para 35. 
21See ECtHR 24 May 1988, Case No. 10737/84, Müller and Others v Switzerland, para 27;33. 
22See ECtHR 23 May 1991, Case No. 11662/85, Oberschlick v Austria, para 57; ECtHR 23 
September 1994, Case No. 15890/89, Jersild v Denmark, para 31.
23Handyside v United Kingdom, para 49. See also Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, para 65; 
Lingens v Austria, para 41; Observer and Guardian v The United Kingdom, para 59; Thorgeir 
Thorgeirson v Iceland para 63; ECtHR 19 December 1994, Case No. 15153/89, Vereinigung 
demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria, para 36; ECtHR 29 March 2001 (Final 29 
June 2001), Case No. 38432/97, Thoma v Luxembourg, para 44; ECtHR 26 September 1995, Case 
No. 17851/91, Vogt v Germany, para 52; ECtHR 11 December 2003 (Final 11 March 2004), Case No. 
39084/97, Yankov v Bulgaria, para 129; ECtHR 30 March 2004, Case No. 53984/00, Radio France 
and Others v France, para 32. 
24See Aurel Sari, “The Danish Cartoons Row: Re-Drawing the Limits of the Right to Freedom of 
Expression?,” Finnish Yearbook of International Law 16 (2005): 379; John Cerone, “Inappropriate 
Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist Resolutions,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 33(2) 
(2008): 365.
25Lingens v Austria, para 41; See also Observer and Guardian v The United Kingdom, para 59; 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland para 63; Castells v Spain para 43; Thoma v Luxembourg para 44-45; 
ECtHR 13 November 2003 (Final 13 February 2004), Case No. 39394/98, Scharsach and News 
Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v. Austria, para 30. 
26Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland para 63; See also ECtHR 25 March 1985, Case No. 8734/79, 
Barthold v Germany, para 58; Observer and Guardian v The United Kingdom, para 59. 
27ECtHR 26 April 1995, Case No. 15974/90, Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para 38. See also 
Thoma v Luxembourg, para 46; ECtHR 16 November 2004 (Final 16 February 2005), Case No. 
56767/00, Selistö v. Finland, para 48. 
28Radio France and Others v France, para 38. 
29 See Lingens v Austria, para 46. 
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Limitations
At this point it is important to note that whereas freedom of thought, conscience and religion
(inner  conviction  or  forum  internum)  is  an  absolute  right,  freedom  of  speech  (external
manifestation or  forum externum) is not,  since it  can be at  the expense of  the rights of
others. Therefore all above mentioned human rights texts provide for limitations, including
hate speech, advocacy of discrimination and religious hatred.30
Article 10(2) of the Convention states that the right to free speech “carries with it duties and
responsibilities”  and  “may  be  subject  to  such  formalities,  conditions,  restrictions  or
penalties”.31 These duties and responsibilities apply in particular to public figures such as
politicians as their speech has a wider reach.32 Second, different limits apply depending on
whether the speech is directed to the government/a politician or a private individual with the
former having “display a greater degree of tolerance”33 as part of his role as a public figure. 
Third, political expression and speech of public interest receives the highest protection with
little scope for restrictions.34 
In order to be justified, these restrictions must be “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a
democratic society”35 Article 52(3) of the ChFREU provides that all rights in the ChFREU
shall have the same scope and meaning of the rights as in the ECHR.
Some states seek to justify blasphemy laws and laws prohibiting defamation of religion(s) on
the  grounds  that  they  aim  at  protecting  public  order.  The  Human  Rights  Committee,
however, made it clear in its General Comment on Article 19 of the ICCPR, that the human
rights framework seeks to protect individuals, not religions or belief system as these types of
laws can be easily abused to discriminate against other religions and their followers and
restrict their rights and freedoms.36 Only “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”37, as outlined in Article 20(2) of
the ICCPR, can be a justified ground for restrictions.
30See Anne Weber, Manual on hate speech (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2009), 1-2, 
accessed on 30 October 2016, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Publications/Hate_Speech_EN.pdf. 
For a definition of hate speech see Council of Europe. Committee of Ministers. Appendix to 
Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on “Hate Speech. 
Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 October 1997 at the 607th meeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies.
31Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights. 
32See ECtHR 16 July 2009 (Final, 10 December 2009), Case No. 15615/07, Féret v Belgium, para 75.
33Lingens v Austria para 42. See also ECtHR 9 June 1998, Case No. 41/1997/825/1031, Incal v 
Turkey, para 54; Sürek v Turkey, para 61; Lombardo and Others v Malta para 54.  
34See Castells v Spain para 42; Sürek v Turkey para 61; Feldek v Slovakia para 74; Fratanoló v 
Hungary para 24.  
35Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights. 
36See U.N. Human Rights Committee, 102nd session, “General comment No. 34. Article 19: Freedom
of opinion and expression,” (CCPR/C/GC/34). 12 September 2011. Last accessed 30 October 2016, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf.
37U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.” 16 December 1966. Last accessed 30 October 2016, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
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The ECtHR has taken a similar stance38, allowing governments to restrict such speech either
under Article 1739 or the exceptions provided under 10(2).40 The Court sought to not only
protect speech aimed at inciting violence against a private or public person or a group but
also at provoking “intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially,
religion”41 
However, the ECtHR has also acknowledged in the controversial landmark case of Otto-
Preminger  that  freedom  of  religion,  alongside  conscience  and  thought,  is  “one  of  the
foundations of a ‘democratic society’”42 and crucial for “the identity of believers and their
conception of life”43. Therefore an interference can be justified as a mean “to protect the right
of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views of
other persons”44 Even though “[t]hose who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their
religion [...] cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism”45, a restriction can be
justified seeing an expression is “gratuitously offensive”, infringes the rights of others and
does “not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human
affairs”.46 
This  decision  was  however  not  supported  by  all  judges.  Judges  Palm,  Pekkanen  and
Makarcyk stress the narrow interpretation of Article 10(2) and little margin of appreciation as
in their view it is detrimental to freedom of  speech as well  as tolerance if  the state is to
decide  what  constitutes  human  progress.  Especially  if  the  interference  concerns  prior
restraint, it runs the risk of protecting the dominant societal groups.47 The Convention does
not in any way “guarantee a right to protection of religious feelings” and  “such a right cannot
be  derived  from the  right  to  freedom  of  religion”.  Freedom  of  religion,  they  point  out,
“includes a right to express views critical of the religious opinions of others”.48  
The case law on religiously offensive speech, so Ian Leigh, suggests that the Court is trying
to  establish  a  hierarchy,  valuing  political  speech  higher  than  commercial  and  artistic
expression. Speech, has to serve social progress and artistic contributions are more likely to
38ECtHR 6 July 2006 (Final 06 October 2006), Case No. 59405/00, Erbakan v Turkey, para 56. See 
also ECtHR 25 November 1996, Case No. 17419/90, Wingrove v The United Kingdom, para 58; 
Sürek v Turkey, para 61; Féret v Belgium, para 73; ECtHR 9 February 2012 (Final 09 May 2012), 
Case No. 1813/07, Vejdeland v. Sweden, para 54-55. 
39Article 17 of the ECHR: Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for 
in the Convention. 
(Invoked e.g. in European Commission on Human Rights 16 November 2004, Case No. 23131/03, 
Norwood v The United Kingdom; ECtHR 11 October 1979, Case No. 8348/78 & 8406/78 (joined 
cases), Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v The Netherlands; ECtHR 20 February 2007, Case No. 
35222/04, Pavel Ivanov v Russia)
40See ECtHR, Hate Speech (Council of Europe Press Unit, June 2016), last accessed 30 October 
2016, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf. 
41Wingrove v The United Kingdom, para 58. 
42ECtHR 20 September 1994, Case No. 13470/87, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, para 47; 
Wingrove v The United Kingdom, para 52. See also ECtHR 25 May 1993, Case No. 14307/88, 
Kokkinakis v. Greece, para 31.
43Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, para 47. See also Kokkinakis v Greece, para 31. 
44Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, para 48.
45Otto Preminger-Institut v Austria para 47. 
46Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria para 49. See also Wingrove v The United Kingdom, para 52;60;  
ECtHR 4 December 2003 (Final 14 June 2004), Case No. 35071/97, Gündüz v. Turkey para 37; 
ECtHR 13 September 2005 (Final 13 December 2005), Case No. 42571/98, İ.A. v. Turkey, para 24. 
47 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, Dissenting Opinion, para 3-4.
48  Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, Dissenting Opinion, para 6.
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be considered as trivial and not of public interest.49 “Beliefs of the value of expression as an
outworking of personal autonomy barely features in the jurisprudence”50, so Leigh.
The Court has also received much criticism for granting such a high protection to religious
feelings and failing to give a strong explanation about the link between religious feelings and
freedom of religion and how expression can infringe on this freedom. Instead of focusing on
how the targeted group perceives the offence, a better approach would be, so Cerone, to
look at the impact of the offence on the behaviour of others towards the targeted group.51 In
recent  judgements,  such  as  Giniewski  and  Klein,  the  Court  seemed  to  reconsider  its
previous reasoning.52 
Applying the legal doctrine to the Charlie Hebdo controversy 
With  regard  to  the  cartoons,  published  by  Charlie  Hebdo,  can  they  be  considered  as
offensive to the extent that they constitute an act of racism, xenophobia or religious hatred?
Charlie Hebdo’s decision to publish the cartoons of Jyllands-Posten in 2006 resulted in a
lawsuit initiated by the  Union of Islamic Organisations of France  (Union des organisations
islamiques de France) and the  Great Mosque of Paris (Grande Mosquée de Paris). They
claimed that  the cartoons intended to defame a group of  persons on the basis  of  their
religious faith.53 The Court,  however,  stressing the importance of  the French tradition of
religious  satire,  did  not  find  the  cartoons  “gratuitously  offensive”,  but  rather  a  valuable
contribution  to  the  public  debate  on  Islamic  terrorism.54 The  case  law  of  the  ECtHR
suggests, that the Court would probably allow France a certain margin of appreciation if a
ban of the cartoons was deemed necessary by the French authorities to protect public order,
morals and religious feelings of  a part  of  its  population.  French law,  however,  is  deeply
rooted in laicité, a strict separation between church and religion, marked by the absence of
blasphemy laws.  Whereas the law accords high protection to individuals against defamation
and  insult,  religions  and  beliefs  are  not  protected  from  blasphemous  speech  and  can
therefore be subject to criticism, offense and ridicule.55
In this context, it seems difficult to argue, that French judges would have deviated from their
previous reasoning with the latest Charlie Hebdo cartoons.56
49See Ian Leigh, “Damned if they do, Damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human RIghts and 
the Protection of Religion from Attack,” Res Publica 17 (2011): 70-71.
50 Leigh, Damned if they do, Damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Protection of Religion from Attack, 70.
51See Cerone, Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist Resolutions, 372.
52ECtHR 31 January 2006 (Final 31 April 2006), Case No. 64016/00, Giniewski v. France. ECtHR 31 
October 2006 (Final 31 January 2007), Case No. 72208/01, Klein v Slovakia. 
53See Francesco Alicino, “Freedom of Expression, Laïcité and Islam in France: The Tension between 
Two Different (Universal) Perspectives,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 27(1) (2016): 60-61.
54See Alicino, Freedom of Expression, Laïcité and Islam in France: The Tension between Two 
Different (Universal) Perspectives, 61-62; Tribunal correctionnel de Paris, March 22, 2007.
55See Rim-Sarah Alouane, “God, the Pencil, and the Judge: Exploring the Paradoxes Regarding 
Protection of Freedom of Religion and Expression in France,” Religion and Human Rights 11 (2016): 
19; Patrick Weil, “Why the French Laïcité is liberal,’ Cardozo Law Review 30(6) (2009): 2704-2705.
56See also Tribunal correctionnel du TGI de Paris(17ième Chambre) 22 October 2002, last accessed 
30 October 2016, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/culture/20021022.OBS1729/islam-houellebecq-
relaxe.html; 
Cour d’Appel de Versailles March 18, 1998, AGRIF c. J-C. Godefroy, last accessed 20 October 2016, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?
oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000006935227&fastReqId=1184023495&fastPos=1; 
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Thus, from a purely legal point of view the Muhammad cartoons of Charlie Hebdo do not
seem all too controversial. 
Justifications for free speech: The Classical 
Debate
Having considered the limits of the law I will move on to look at offensive speech from a
more philosophical angle. How do legal philosophers define the scope of free speech and
where do they draw the limits? 
The many justifications for free speech can be grouped into two classes: consequentialist
and non-consequentialist justifications. Consequentialist justifications such as the argument
from truth, the argument from diversity, the argument from democracy, the argument from
distrust,  the  pressure release argument  or  the slippery slope  argument,  seek  to protect
speech in order to reach a desired outcome. Non-consequentialist justifications consider free
speech as the end itself, such as the argument from autonomy.57 
Below I will discuss three justifications, also known as the classical debate, the argument
from truth, the argument from democracy and the argument from autonomy. 
The Argument from Truth
The argument  from truth  as  a  justification  for  free speech  has  its  root  in  16th  century
England when Sir Peter Wentworth addressed the House of Commons and made a plea for
freedom of speech arguing that “[a]n evil man can do the less harm when it is known” and “a
wicked  purpose  may  the  easier  be  prevented  when  it  is  known”.58 In  other  words,  by
exposing dangerous ideas to the scrutiny of the public they can be openly debated upon and
as a result proven erroneous compared to other ideas. This rests on the assumption that
truth can defeat and bury falsehood, which became widely accepted in the 17 th and 18th
century. One expression of this conviction is John Milton's famous Areopagitica, written in
the 17th century. John Milton was influenced by the Leveller claim of free speech and writers
like  Henry  Robinson,  propagating  religious  toleration  and  William  Walwyn,  opposing
censorship so that the power of truth can unfold itself.59 John Stuart Mill developed this idea
further arguing in favour of a public discourse that is open to all views and opinions in order
and Cassation civ. (2ième Chambre) 8 March 2001, AGRIF c. J-C. Godefroy, last accessed 30 
October 2016,  https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?
oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000007042949&fastReqId=104063277&fastPos=1; 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, AGRIF c. Charlie Hebdo, June 2, 2009, Cour d’ Appel de Paris,
April 7, 2010.
57See Susan J. Brison, “The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech,” Ethics 108(2) (1998): 320-321; Jan 
Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 13-
18.
58Simon d’Ewes, “Journal of the House of Commons:1576,” in The Journals of All the Parliaments 
During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth (Shannon, Ire: Irish University Press, 1682), 236-251. British 
History Online, accessed 29 October 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/jrnl-parliament-
eliz1/pp236-251.
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to better identify the falsehood of an idea. Human beings are not free from error and neither
is our judgement but constant collective questioning, analysing, criticising and exploring over
generations  makes  it  possible  to  decrease  the  amount  of  erroneous  beliefs.60 In  his
dissenting opinion in the case Abrams v United States Justice Holmes  coined the term
'marketplace of ideas' and speaks of a ‘free trade in ideas’ and ‘that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market’.61 Like a
market of goods we presume that the market of ideas does regulate itself so that the good
and sensible ones will convince the most people and will therefore succeed. Proponents of
the argument from truth stress that even radical, disrespectful, insulting or anti-social ideas
should  find  access  to  the  common  marketplace  as  they  will  hopefully  be  refuted  and
refused.62
However,  the very notion of  truth has been subject  to  much criticism.  Edwin Baker and
Stanley Ingber, for example, question the existence of an objective and discoverable truth.63
However,  one  can  refute  this  objection  by  arguing  that  the  argument  from truth  is  not
necessarily concerned with finding the truth but constantly challenging an idea perceived as
true, even with erroneous ideas. Second, Baker and Ingber challenge the human capacity  to
assess different ideas rationally, a presumption essential to the marketplace model.64 People
are influenced by psychological  factors such as “‘subconscious’ repressions,  phobias,  or
desires”  and  “stimulus-response  mechanisms  and  selective  attention  and  retention
processes”65.  
Since  the  1990s  and  especially  in  the  light  of  the  financial  crisis  in  the  late  2000s,
scholarship, drawing from psychology and behavioural economics, was also considering a
possible market failure on the market of ideas.
First, just like on a traditional market there is imperfect competition. Imperfect competition
can result from idea producers being unequally funded to disseminate their ideas or from a
monopoly where only one party is able to dominate which ideas are being disseminated in
public.66 Alvin Goldman and James Cox conclude in their analysis of the ‘Market Maximizes
Truth Possession’ (MMTP) that in certain domains such as astrology or the occult regulation
would  prevent  an  accumulation  of  false  and  erroneous  ideas.  Scientific  and  academic
speech for example is a highly controlled domain. Yet, it is widely accepted as a forum where
discoveries  and  achievements  with  a  great  chance  of  being  true  are  disseminated.
Moreover, they argue, there are indeed effective government policies regulating the market
59See Jeffery A. Smith, “Freedom of Expression and the Marketplace of Ideas Concept from Milton to 
Jefferson,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 7(1) (1981): 47; 49-51.
60See Sarah Sorial, “Free Speech, Autonomy, and the Marketplace of Ideas,” Journal of Value Inquiry 
44 (2010): 170.
61Justice Holmes, Dissenting Opinion, Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919), 631, accessed 
29 October 2016 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/250/616#writing-
USSC_CR_0250_0616_ZO. 
62See Sorial, Free Speech, Autonomy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 170-171.
63See C. Edwin Baker, “Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,” UCLA Law Review 25(5)
(1978): 974-975; Stanley Ingber, “The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth.” Duke Law Journal 
1984(1) (1984): 15.
64See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 975-977; Ingber, The Marketplace of
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 34-36
65See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 977.
66See Gregory Brazeal, “How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the Marketplace of Ideas,” 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 21(1) (2011): 8-9; 30-31.
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such as laws requiring producers of food and drugs to correctly label their products to protect
consumers.67
Another market failure is imperfect information. This occurs when idea consumers do not
have sufficient background knowledge about the ideas available on the market and therefore
face difficulties in determining the level of quality of an idea. Just like credit-rating agencies
on  a  traditional  market,  the  parties  often  rating  ideas  such  as  the  media,  professors,
specialists, family or friends are prone to failure. Another failure concerns transaction costs
as ideas that are easier to grasp will end up with more followers than ideas that are more
complex.68
The Argument from Democracy
Alexander  Meiklejohn  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  advocates  of  the  argument  from
democracy, postulating that the justification of free speech stems from three responsibilities
of the electorate. First, knowledge of the policy issues at stake, second, an opinion regarding
these  policies  and  third,  suggestions  on  how  to  make  these  policies  better  and  more
effective.  Therefore,  free speech must  be guaranteed as it  constitutes a prerequisite for
people to inform themselves to make sensible and well-informed decisions.69
Post stresses that an argument based on the value of democracy must include more than
informed democratic decision-making. A government can only be regarded as legitimate if its
citizens also have the chance to engage in the public discourse and thus influence decision-
making processes.  Speech that  is  necessary for  a  properly  functioning public  discourse
receives protection under the principle of free speech. In his opinion free speech doctrine
should rest on the assumption that all ideas, whether good or bad, true or false are equal as
is  the  political  status  of  the  citizens.  Democracy  only  applies  to  the  relationship  of
governments  and  its  citizens,  meaning  that  speech  that  takes  place  outside  the  public
discourse is not necessarily protected and governments are allowed to differentiate between
true and false  or  misleading ideas,  for  example product  labelling.70 Weinstein  draws on
Post’s  notion of  public  discourse and  its  importance for  democratic  legitimacy  and self-
governance but unlike Post he focuses more on the content rather than the context when
assessing the level of protection of speech.71 Both, however, argue that even speech that
can potentially harm people such as racist and anti-Semitic speech or advocacy of illegal
activities, should not be restricted if it happens as part of the public discourse.72
67See  Alvin I. Goldman, “Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas,” Legal Theory 2(1) (1996): 
12-14.
68See Brazeal, How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the Marketplace of Ideas, 32-33; 35.
69See Alexander Meiklejohn, “The First Amendment is an Absolute,” The Supreme Court Review 1961
(1961): 255-257.
70See Robert Post, “Participatory Democracy and Free Speech,” Virginia Law Review 97(3) (2011): 
482-485.
71See James Weinstein, “Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech 
Doctrine,” Virginia Law Review 97(3) (2011): 493-494.
72See Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 
499-500; 512-513.
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Whereas it is justifiable for Eric Barendt to restrict incitement to criminal activity, he stresses
that this should not be the case for extreme political speech such as advocacy for terrorism.
The public may have an interest  in hearing about the views,  arguments and motives of
terrorists in order to grasp and find ways to deal  with the issue.  Secondly,  criminalising
terrorist propaganda does not eradicate the problem itself. It merely pushes the issue out of
the public  discourse  and into  the private  sphere.  It  is  questionable,  he  argues,  when a
government seeks to prohibit speech it does not agree with.73  
Eugene Volokh points out that free speech should not be limited to the protection of a “public
discourse” as, unlike the truth rationale, it only indirectly links scientific, religious, moral or
historical speech to democracy and in this regard fails to acknowledge the importance of
such types of speech. Universities, think-tanks and an informed citizenry, not governments,
should be responsible to assess these types of  ideas and their validity through scientific
inquiry, because any governmental influence through financing, employment and education
undermines an objective search for truth and impacts on the public discourse.74
The argument from democracy is therefore prone to rule out the protection of non-political
speech,  or  speech that  does  not  form part  of  the public  discourse.  The  argument  from
autonomy, as outlined in the next chapter, includes a much wider range of types of speech. 
The Argument from Autonomy
The concept of autonomy, as a non-consequentialist or deontological approach, is based on
the ability or the right of a person to govern his or her actions.75 According to Scanlon an
autonomous person  “must  see  himself  as  sovereign in  deciding  what  to  believe and  in
weighing competing reasons for action”.76 Therefore one “cannot accept without independent
consideration the judgement of others as to what he should believe or what he should do.”77
There are different concepts of autonomy at play. Christian Rostbøll distinguishes between a
Millian autonomy and a Kantian autonomy. Proponents of the former see autonomy as a
character  ideal  encouraging  people  to critically  reflect  on  themselves  which can lead  to
people exercising their right to free speech in an arrogant and disrespectful way. A Kantian
understanding of autonomy considers autonomy as a quality inherent in every human being
and  respecting  this  autonomy  is  a  prerequisite  to  accept  each  other  as  humans  and
therefore  as  equals.  Arrogant  behaviour  would  lead  to  denying  each  other’s  equality,
meaning that disrespectful speech is not as easily justified.78
73See Eric Barendt, “Threats to Freedom of Speech in the United Kingdom,” University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 28(3) (2005): 895-898.
74See Eugene Volokh, “In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free 
Speech Protection,” Virginia Law Review 97(3) (2011): 595-599.
75See Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 323
76Thomas Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(2) (1972): 
215.
77Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 216.
78See Christian F. Rostbøll, “Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon Controversy,” 
Political Theory 37(5) (2009): 624; 629-630; 633-634.
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Basing  free speech on a  Millian understanding of  autonomy also leads to people  being
exposed to inaccurate and deceptive speech and this, Susan Brisan argues, can present a
danger to a person's autonomy.79 In a later publication Scanlon revised the absoluteness of
his earlier theory of freedom of expression accepting that it failed to allow, for example, for a
ban on misleading advertising.80 Brison also criticises Scanlon insofar as his theory does not
allow  for  restricting  advocacy  of  discrimination  and  violence  towards  social,  ethnic  or
religious groups.81 For Scanlon the argument from autonomy is more vested in banning any
governmental interference regarding the exercise of free speech than recognising the right of
individuals to autonomy.82 She however points out the inconsistency of this approach as it
does not oblige the government to respect the autonomy of its citizens but still values an
autonomous human being.83 Scanlon later acknowledges that a constraint on governmental
interference is solely based on the importance of autonomy.84
Like the argument from truth, the argument from autonomy is also heavily reliant on the
presumption of a rationally acting human being exposing this argument to similar criticism.
In  this  regard,  Sarah Sorial  questions the justification of  scholars  such as Scanlon and
Thomas Nagel85 to object the restriction of pornographic speech or advocacy of violence
such  as  terrorist  propaganda.  Terrorist  propaganda as  well  as  pornography do  not  use
rational means but rather try to convey their message by appealing to a more subconscious
level and triggering emotions such as prejudice, hatred or anger against a particular group.86
The very act of persuasion, according to Marcel Kinsbourne, is both cognitive and emotional
in  nature  and  depends  on  a  phenomenon  he  calls  entrainment.  By  entrainment  he
understands the human capacity to imitate others and accept their views without rational
reasoning. This applies in particular to group behaviour seeing that groups often have rituals
performed together in unison such as hymns, marching songs, prayers and goose-steps.87
Further,  Susan Hurley stresses  the  connection between media  violence  and  aggressive
behaviour. Hence, the fact that violent behaviour is often taken up unconsciously instead of
through autonomous deliberative processes coupled with the influence of the media over
public  opinion questions  a  justification of  violent  speech with  the argument  of  audience
autonomy.88 
These new insights in the act of imitation force scholars now to reconsider the presumption
of rationality liberal theory draws on.
79See Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 328.
80See Thomas Scanlon, “Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,” University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 40 (1979): 530-532.
81See Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 329.
82See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 221.
83See Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 329-330.
84See Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 533-534.
85See Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24(2) (1995): 
83-107.
86See Sorial, Free Speech, Autonomy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 177-178.
87See Marcel Kinsbourne, “Imitation as Entrainment: Brain Mechanisms and Social Consequences,” 
in Perspectives on Imitation. From Neuroscience to Social Science, ed. Susan Hurley and Nick 
Chater, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 170-171.
88See Susan Hurley, “Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech.” Philosophical Studies 117 
(2004): 166-167; 177-178; 186-187; 194-195; 204-205.
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There are also scholars, such as  Kabasakal Badamchi, using more than one justification for
the protection of free speech to make up for the other argument’s shortcomings, arguing that
autonomy  and  democratic  participation  are  complementary.  As  mentioned  above,  the
autonomy argument is too broad and seeks to protect all speech irrespective of the possible
harm being done such as hate speech and violent pornography. Combining autonomy with
political  participation  as  grounds  for  free  speech  protection  helps  granting  a  stronger
protection for political speech without flatly refusing to protect other types. It nevertheless
provides for a justification to regulate speech such as deceptive advertising, hate speech,
violent pornography, private libel and non-democratic speech. 89
Applying the arguments from the classical debate to the Charlie
Hebdo controversy
Applying the classical debate on free speech justifications on the Charlie Hebdo cartoons, it
seems difficult to argue in favour of their prohibition. Firstly, we need to discuss the question
whether the publication of cartoons can be justified as they contribute to the search for truth
or the best idea. It is difficult to maintain that the cartoons are a form of speech, for which
regulation aims to prevent the spread of misinformation. Instead they took part in the public
debate on questions evolving around living together in a multicultural society and on how to
deal with different values and norms by questioning such norms and values. They deal with
important questions such as how to treat norms and values of others or how to deal with
disrespectfulness. Even if they transgressed boundaries, crossing limits can help finding and
determining exactly these limits. Forbidding the publication of such cartoons would mean
making a value judgement and claiming that the ideas behind the cartoons were erroneous.
As an idea they have to withstand the competition on the market of ideas and if they turn out
to be false or if  another idea is considered better, they won’t emerge as victorious. Only
when every individual has the opportunity to perform at full potential, can the best ideas be
found for society as a whole. 
Secondly,  the argument from democracy postulates that  every idea,  if  part  of  the public
discourse,  should be treated as equal,  just like citizens,  so that  citizens can make well-
informed decisions. A government can only be deemed legitimate when everybody is able to
take part in the public discourse. Charlie Hebdo can be considered as a political newspaper,
part of the French left, thus we can claim that its socio-critical content is of public interest
and contributes to the public debate. As argued above the cartoons in question can be said
to contribute to  debates on limits of free speech, difficulties in multicultural societies, or the
role of religion in a society. These are debates which are of vital importance for the public as
their outcomes can have wide implication on all individuals.
Even if Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons can be seen as racist, Weinstein, Post and Barendt argue
that even racist and extreme political speech should be allowed as a ban would simply push
this  kind of  speech  into  the underground.  The public has  an  interest  to  hear  about  the
motives,  arguments  and  ideas  of  the  proponents  of  such  speech  in  order  to  better
understand it.
89See Devrim Kabasakal Badamchi, “Justifications of freedom of speech: Towards a double-grounded
non-consequentialist approach,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 41(9) (2015): 920-923.
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Third, even if we assume the cartoons do not benefit human progress or democracy, it can
be questioned if a ban would infringe on the cartoonist’s right to express themselves and
therefore on their autonomy to govern themselves and make their own decisions. 
The argument from autonomy seeks to protect all speech, also potentially harmful speech. 
The  violent  reaction  of  those  who  were  allegedly  offended,  and  felt  targeted  is  indeed
worrisome,  however  restricting  speech  because  of  fear  of  violent  reactions,  also  called
Heckler's  veto,  is  problematic  as  there  will  always  be  someone  disagreeing  with  an
utterance. Especially in a pluralistic society this might lead to a decrease in the scope of free
speech. The question is also whether the reaction can be directly linked to the cartoons or
whether it was a symptom of a different problem.
We can  indeed  use  a  Kantian  perception  of  autonomy which  encourages  a  respectful
behaviour towards each other, emphasising equity of all people. At this point however, one
might question if we still treat each other as equal if we apply considerations towards one
group’s sensitivities but not to another one's. Looking at the classical debate the cartoons do
not seem very controversial as they can be justified with each of the three justifications. 
Therefore, let us consider the theory of defamation of religion, which links free speech more
concretely to freedom of religion, discrimination on grounds of religion and the protection of
religious feelings.
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The Theory of Defamation of Religion
In  the  cartoon  controversy in  France  it  can  be  noticed  that  there was  friction  between
different groups in the French society: one group defending a wide interpretation of  free
speech  and  the  other  demanding  protection  of  their  religious  feelings.  Societies  are  in
constant  change  and  contradictions  that  create  conflicts  stimulate  these  change  and
development processes. These changes are then ideally reflected in changes of the law. In
order to further explore the topic of religiously offensive cartoons it is therefore necessary to
look closer at this friction. The theory of defamation explains this friction by postulating that
there are two freedoms that overlap and therefore compete with each other:  freedom of
speech and  freedom of  religion.  This  chapter  seeks  to  study  this  theory  as  well  as  its
criticism in more detail to see if it can provide valuable insights into the root causes of the
French cartoon controversy.  
As every monotheistic world religion claims exclusivity, blasphemy is considered a severe
offence in all religious doctrines. Many states have codified blasphemy provisions which can
aim to safeguard the dominant religious belief against speech and publications intended to
provoke, shock or hurt the feelings of the believers but also to protect public order.
There is one big difference between states with Islam and Christianity being the predominant
religion. In Islamic law there is no clear cut distinction between blasphemy and apostasy but
the  two  crimes  rather  go  hand  in  hand  with  substantial  overlap.  In  statutory  law  of
predominantly Christian states, merely having doubts about certain facts and issues of a
religious doctrine or denying the existence of god usually does not amount to blasphemy.
The blasphemy provisions  in  Christian  states differ  inasmuch as that  some states  have
generic blasphemy prohibitions whereas others have provisions prohibiting blasphemous
libel  of  only  one  specific  religion.  This  concerns  mainly  states  where  one  Christian
denomination has been enshrined as the state religion.90 Several EU member states include
blasphemy  laws,  among  them  are  Austria,  Germany,  Denmark,  Finland,  Greece,  Italy,
Ireland and Poland. 
The Scandinavian countries'  Penal  Codes,  for  example,  have  generic  provisions,  as  do
Austria and Germany. The Greek provision in the constitution is non-discriminatory in nature,
however  discriminatory  in  the  Greek  Penal  Code  and  in  reality  protecting  the  Greek
Orthodox Church.91 The situation is  similar  in  Poland.  Even with article  196 of  Poland’s
Penal Code being generic, the powerful role the Catholic Church plays in Polish society and
politics  cannot  be  disregarded.92 Ireland  used  to  be  an  example  of  a  country  with
discriminatory blasphemy provisions, however in 2009 it changed to a generic one including
all religions.93
90Jeroen Temperman, “Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions and Human Rights Law,” Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 26(4) (2008): 518-519; 522.
91 See Temperman, Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions and Human Rights Law, 521.
92  Jo-Anne Prud’homme, Policing Belief: The Impact of Blasphemy Laws on Human Rights 
(Freedom House, October 2010), 90-91, accessed 29 October 2016, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Policing_Belief_Full.pdf.  
93 See Reporters without Borders, “EU countries urged to repeal blasphemy laws,” last modified 20 
January 2016, accessed 29 October 2016, https://rsf.org/en/news/eu-countries-urged-repeal-
blasphemy-laws.
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There are repeatedly discussions on repealing all sorts of blasphemy provisions. In 2008 the
United  Kingdom  abandoned  its  blasphemy  laws  as  part  of  the  Criminal  Justice  and
Immigration Act 2008. It was considered inconsistent with the non-discrimination principle
because it only referred to the Church of England.94 These discussions gained momentum
after  the  attack  on  Charlie  Hebdo.  In  2012  the  Netherlands  repealed  its  blasphemy
provision95 and Malta followed in 2016.96 Iceland too abolished the offence of blasphemy
provisions  six  months  after  the  attack  on  Charlie  Hebdo,  a  bill  backed  by  most  of  the
Icelandic religious leaders. France has repealed its blasphemy laws as early as 1789, except
for the region of Alsace-Moselle, where it has been reintroduced when part of the German
empire from 1871-1918.97 
Many Christian countries have invoked blasphemy provisions less in the last decades but in
many Islamic countries they are very much in use and defaming the Qur’an, the prophet or
other sacred personages can result in (life) imprisonment or the death penalty.98
Blasphemy laws however  protect  public  order  interests  and therefore merely  criminalise
blasphemous behaviour  that is at the same time disorderly conduct.99 The defamation of
religion theory on the other side pursues the aim of criminalising defamation of religion and
hence protecting religion as such. Being a permanent observer at the United Nations in New
York, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly Organization of the Islamic
Conference)  plays  a  major  role  in  advocating  and  shaping  the  ‘counter-defamation
discourse’ at  an international  level.  The organisation has been influential  in drafting and
passing  various  UN resolutions  in  the  Commission  on  Human  Rights  (UNCHR),  which
became the Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and later in the UN General Assembly, aimed
at protecting religions against defamation. Acknowledging the right to freedom of expression,
the resolutions are concerned with increasing religious intolerance and discrimination and
link defamation of religion to discrimination of the individual based on religion suggesting that
94 See Temperman, Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions and Human Rights Law, 520; The Guardian,
“Criminal Justice and Immigration Act,” 19 January 2009, last accessed 29 October 2016,  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/13/criminal-justice-
immigration-act. 
95 See BBC, ”Dutch approve move to scrap blasphemy law,” 29 November 2012, last accessed 29 
October 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20530428. 
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http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160714/local/repealing-blasphemy-law-a-victory-for-
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defamation of religion should form part of the reasons free speech can be restricted.100 The
first  resolution,  sponsored by Pakistan in 1999 reasoned that  increasing intolerance and
discrimination of Islam and the fact that “Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with
human rights violations and with terrorism” makes it necessary to combat this issue and to
“encourage understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion or
belief”101 Until its dissolution, the Commission has passed a new version of this resolution
each year, stressing basically the same issues.102 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the
atmosphere was favourable  to  pass  a  resolution in  the UNCHR using a more  powerful
language to condemn defamation of religion and to require a more substantial contribution to
promote tolerance respect and religious diversity.103 The necessity to protect religions, and
Islam in particular, was backed by reports of the Special Rapporteur articulating “fears about
a rise of Islamophobia among public opinion in the West” and concerns about the way Islam
and Muslim people have been portrayed by politicians and the media.104
With Islam being referred to more often than in previous resolutions it suggests a strong
preference for the protection of Islam over other religions and beliefs.105 The Danish cartoon
controversy in 2005 gave another major impetus to the development of creating a right to
have  one’s  religious  feelings  protected.  The  conclusion drawn from the  Danish  cartoon
controversy was that there seems to be a clash between two rights, namely the freedom of
expression and an allegedly right to have one’s religious feelings protected.106 
100See Rebecca J. Dobras, “Is the United Nations Endorsing Human Rights Violations?: An Analysis 
of the United Nations’ Combating Defamation of Religions Resolutions and Pakistan’s Blasphemy 
Laws,” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 37(2) (2009): 341-343.
101U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 62nd Meeting. “Resolution 1999/82 [Defamation of religions]” 
(E/CN.4/RES/1999/82). 30 April 1999.
102See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 67th Meeting. “Resolution 2000/84 [Defamation of 
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2003/4 [Combating defamation of religions]” (E/CN.4/RES/2003/4). 14 April 2003; U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights, 45th Meeting. “Resolution 2004/6 [Combating Defamation of Religions]” 
(E/CN.4/RES/2004/6). 13 April 2004; U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 44th Meeting. “Resolution 
2005/3 [Combating defamation of religions]” (E/CN.4/RES/2005/3). 12 April 2005.
103See Allison G. Belnap, “Defamation of Religions: A Vague and Overbroad Theory that Threatens 
Basic Human Rights,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2010 (2010): 656-657;
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Report submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/40” (E/CN.4/2003/66). 15 January 
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In the highly tense atmosphere the debate eventually found its way into the UN General
Assembly,  resulting  in  a  resolution  titled  “Combating  Defamation  of  Religion”.107 Similar
resolution were passed in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.108 
Since 2011 a turn in the discourse on defamation of religions can be noticed in the UNHRC
as the debate has moved away from protecting religions against defamation but  instead
centred on strengthening the protection of individuals against discrimination violence based
on religion.109 This change can likewise be observed in the General Assembly.110
Criticism
The Defamation of Religions Theory has been subject to a considerable amount of criticism
coming from both Human Rights NGOs and academics.
In a submission to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2007, the International
Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) questions the alleged aim of the resolutions, namely
protecting  the  freedom  of  religion,  as  human  rights  seek  to  protect  individuals,  not
religions.111 This argument is also supported by Jeroen Temperman who argues that the
alleged clash between freedom of religion and freedom of expression does not exist. The
right to freedom of religion does not include a right to have one’s religious feelings protected
107See L. Bennett Graham, “Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism,” Emory International Law 
Review 23 (2009): 71; U.N. General Assembly, 64th Meeting. “Resolution 60/150 [Combating 
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(A/HRC/RES/22/31). 22 March 2013; U.N. Human Rights Council, 56th Meeting. “Resolution 25/34 
[Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to 
violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief]” (A/HRC/RES/25/34). 28 March 
2014; U.N. Human Rights Council, 58th Meeting. “Resolution 28/29 [Combating intolerance, negative 
stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, 
persons based on religion or belief]” (A/HRC/RES/28/290. 27 March 2015; U.N. Human Rights 
Council, 64th Meeting. “Resolution 31/26 [Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and 
stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on 
religion or belief]” (A/HRC/RES/31/26). 24 March 2016.
110See U.N. General Assembly, 89th Meeting. “Resolution 66/167 [Combating intolerance, negative 
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111See International Humanist and Ethical Union, “‘Combating Defamation of Religion’ unnecessary, 
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because criticism, parody, mockery, libel or insult do not hinder a person to hold on to his or
her belief.112 Maxim Grindberg stresses that being able to criticise religions is crucial in a
democratic society as it is a matter of public concern to be kept up to date about different
ideas and opinions on religions and social norms. Especially a public debate on the alleged
link  between terrorism and  Islam is  of  crucial  importance  as  to  avoid  Islam from being
misused for the purpose of radicalisation.113
Another major point of criticism is the portrayal of all varieties of criticism of religion and in
particular  of  Islam  as  hate  speech  and  ‘Islamophobia’  as  it  authorises  governments  to
adhere  to  traditions  contradictory  to  human  rights  such  as  stoning  women  accused  of
infidelity.  The absence of  a  commonly accepted definition and interpretation  of  the term
‘defamation’ gives countries the power to define acts of defamation, which can lead to abuse
such as discriminating against religious minorities and silencing dissent.114
Pakistan is often mentioned as an example of a country (ab)using blasphemy provisions as
a mean to limit  the rights of religious minorities.115 Freedom of speech is provided for by
Article  19  of  the  Pakistani  constitution,  however  this  freedom  shall  be  “subject  to  any
reasonable restrictions imposed by law in  the interest  of  the glory  of  Islam”116 Rebecca
Dobra stresses that even though Pakistan portrays the ‘Defamation of Religions’ resolutions
as a mean to advocate religious tolerance and understanding, in reality, its own blasphemy
laws have quite the opposite effect. Lack of judicial independence and proper examination of
cases allows for accusations stemming from personal animosities or jealousy, economic or
professional competition. This endangers especially minorities, such as the Ahmadi, but also
journalists, lawyers and at times more liberal Muslims. Second, many lawyers and judges
are reluctant  to accept  cases and breaches of  the blasphemy provisions are often non-
bailable resulting in lengthy trials.117 Temperman observes similar practices in Iran, mainly
targeting  the  Bahd’is,  and  to  silence  political  dissent  such  as  the  women’s  rights
movement.118
It is important to keep in mind that incitement to violence, racism and xenophobia is a much
more narrow concept than defamation of religion and defined and codified in international as
well  as  national  legislation.  Only  in  some  cases  can  a  blasphemous  expression,  e.g.
‘advocacy of religious hatred’ be considered as part of the category ‘defamation of religions’.
Mere criticism or negative stereotyping of  religions does not rise to the level  of  religious
hatred as laid down in Article 19 and 20 ICCPR. In the UN context it seems however that no
distinction between the two is being made.119  
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The abuse of blasphemy provisions in practice is one of the reasons many scholars argue
that there is no need for such laws, as incitement to violence is a well-established legal
doctrine providing sufficient  legal  framework  to  prosecute  hate  speech and advocacy of
religious hatred. This approach allows for a more objective examination of the speech than
defamation of religion which requires a more moral judgement.120
Applying the Theory of Defamation of Religion to the Charlie 
Hebdo controversy 
On the one side it can be argued that the controversy could have been avoided were there
either anti-defamation or anti-blasphemy laws in France. Such laws might have indeed had
the  effect  to  promote  tolerance,  mutual  understanding  and  respect  for  each  other  in  a
multicultural and multi-religious society as it is the case in France.
However, as the critics of the defamation of religion theory have pointed out, human rights
seek to protect the individual from defamation, not  religion and religious figures such as
Muhammad. Defamation of religion laws would not have protected the Muslim minority in
France,  but  rather  Islam  as  such.  Second,  seeing  the  French  tradition  of  secularism,
defamation laws force a “religiously neutral” government to make a moral decision on what
constitutes an act of defamation and what does not.
What  about  blasphemy laws?  Could  they  have  prevented  the  attack  and  the  following
controversy  and  protected  public  order?  Even  though  blasphemy laws  seek  to  prevent
societal unrest, they too tend to rather infringe than protect the rights of individuals, namely
minorities.  They  often  criminalise  more  than  incitement  to  religious  hatred  and  violence
provisions and hence curb individuals' rights. At this point, I side with Temperman, and argue
that cartoons, even if they provoke or offend a religious group, do not per se infringe on a
person’s right to belief  what he or she deems to be right.  The publication did not inhibit
French Muslims from exercising their right to freedom of religion. 
The question now is  whether the controversy that  arose following the publication of  the
cartoons is an expression of a deeper rooted feeling of inequality and injustice in the French
society. I will take a closer look at a similar controversy in Denmark to see if any conclusions
can be drawn and applied to the French case. 
120See Temperman, Jeroen. “Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivities in Pluralist Societies: 
Facing the Challenge of Extreme Speech.” Brigham Young Law Review 2011(3) (2011): 730-731; 743.
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The Danish Cartoon Controversy
After several incidents such as the struggles of Danish writer Kare Bluitgen to find illustrators
for his children’s book about Muhammad, the cultural editor of Jyllands-Posten, Flemming
Rose, decided start a contest, asking cartoonists to depict the prophet how they see him.121
On 30 September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons
as  part  of  an editorial  called  The Face  of  Muhammad.  The text  was  about  freedom of
expression and self-censorship stemming from fear of violent reactions from Muslims.122 
Rose  Flemming  claims that  the cartoons  were not  intended to  “demonize or  stereotype
Muslims”  but  rather  to affirm that  Muslims are “part  of  our  society,  not  strangers”.  “The
cartoons  are  including,  rather  than  excluding,  Muslims”.  Calling  to  respect  religious
prohibitions  is  according  to  him  not  a  matter  of  “respect”  but  “submission”,  something
“incompatible with a secular democracy”.123
Reactions  included  death  threats  for  the  cartoonists,  demonstrations,  riots  and  burning
embassies  causing  over  100  deaths  worldwide.  Portraying  Muhammad  is  generally
considered as blasphemy among Muslims and the dimensions of the reactions illustrate how
deeply rooted this conviction is.124
The controversy has been understood as yet another illustration of the unavoidable conflict
between liberal democracy and multiculturalism. In order to defend the democratic values,
such as free speech, it was considered important that no apology from the cartoonists was
offered.125 “[F]reedom of speech is the most valuable right of liberty. We must defend it to the
very last”126, proclaims the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In a speech in
Berlin in February 2006 writer and activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali defended what she called the “right
to offend”, claiming that it was “their duty as journalists to solicit and publish drawings of the
prophet Muhammad” to protect liberty, democracy and our open society. She agrees with
Rasmussen’s  decision  to  turn  down  an  invitation  for  a  meeting  with  ambassadors  from
Islamic countries as in her opinion they are clearly abusing their diplomatic role to push
through their own agenda.127 Paul Belien from the Brussels Journal (which re-published all
the  cartoons  from  Jyllands-Posten)  even  compared  self-censorship  of  politicians  and
intellectuals to “appeasement”.128
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Cindy Holder however stresses that the cartoonists were never expected to apologise for
making use of their right to speak out but rather for what they expressed. This means that
they cannot be seen as defenders of free speech but rather as defenders of a particular view
of Muhammad and Islam. Thus, it was about the power to speak about a group in whatever
way they pleased and the power to exclude them and their views from the discourse by
making the discourse on how Danes see Islam and Muhammad.129
Along similar lines Stéphanie Lagoutte concludes that  the public discourse centred more
about the defence of an absolute concept of free speech being a core value of the Danish
society and culture which led to the fact that the cartoons itself were not seen as particularly
contentious. A negative and at times hostile portrayal of Muslims and Islam in Danish media,
discrimination or tougher laws for non-Danes was neglected.130
Geoffrey Levey and Tariq Modood suggest that the cartoons represent a form of racism by
singling out Muslims as their target group and that it  is possible to 'racialise'  a religious
group, as has happened with the Jews or Bosnian Muslims.131 Randall Hansen refutes this
claim, arguing that the cartoons alone cannot reveal racist intentions of the illustrators or a
hostile environment towards Muslims in Denmark. Neither do the cartoons represent hate
speech but rather hatred of religion and in a secular and liberal democracy religion has to be
subject to ridicule and scorn.132 
The problem with using an understanding of autonomy as an ideal personality trait to defend
almost  absolute  free speech in  the Danish controversy led to,  so Christian Rostbøll,  an
arrogant  attitude  towards  Muslims  under  the  assumption  that  they  did  not  have  an
autonomous relationship with their religion. Rather than giving an incentive to critically reflect
upon  themselves  and  their  beliefs,  it  was  used  to  show  the  difference  between  “fully
enlightened”  Westerners  and  Muslims  when  being  confronted  with  disrespectful  and
offensive speech. He concludes that a Kantian concept of autonomy in addition to the Millian
would have been better suited to overcome the alleged conflict of autonomy with respect for
diversity.133
Gina  Gustavsson  points  out  that  what  Rose  seeks  to  protect  is  not  autonomy  and
autonomous  self-reflection  but  in  fact  authentic  self-expression,  or  “romantic  liberalism”.
Rose places great importance on free speech as a mean for personal development through
expressing our own story, beliefs, convictions and perceptions, no matter how disrespectful
or  provocative.  Only  then  can  we  truly  understand  and  create  our  own  character  and
personality.  In this way,  the cartoons were not  primarily directed at  Muslims to enlighten
them or show their lack of distance with religion but rather at those who engage in any sort
of censorship, be it out of fear or of respect.134
129See Holder, Debating the Danish Cartoons: Civil Rights or Civil Power?, 182-184.
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133See Rostbøll, Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon Controversy, 624; 629-
630; 638.
134See Gina Gustavsson, “Romantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Disrespect in 
the Muhammad Cartoons Controversy,” Political Studies 62(1) (2014): 57-61.
28
Paul Sturges highlights that one must differentiate between communication directed at the
political, economic and social elite and communication coming from those in power. Articles
in newspaper or magazines are certainly an expression of the journalist's’ own belief and
perception but  it  is  important  to take into account  editorial  policies and the influence of
investors  and  close  ties  with  governments,  lending  those  holding  the  power  a  way  of
communication.  This  makes it  subject  to a  different  level  of  responsibility  as outlined in
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration.135 Jyllands-Posten has the highest run in Denmark
and is known to have a close relationship with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danish Prime
Minister at that time, who was governing the country in a coalition with the far-right Danish
People’s party.136 As discussed earlier, the Prime Minister and the cartoonists seemed to
defend a similar standpoint in this controversy suggesting that the cartoons itself were more
than simply a call  for freedom of  expression and against  self-censorship.  Therefore it  is
crucial to look at the broader context within which the cartoons were published in order to
detect to what extend there were power relations involved.
The Danish legal system provides two articles in connection with the controversy: a hate-
speech provision (§266b) and a blasphemy provision (§140) of the Danish Criminal Code.137
By deciding not to bring the case before the Danish courts under one of the provision, the
prosecution followed established case law from the last decades. But Lagoutte draws the
attention to a similar case in 1938 when the prosecution invoked §140 in order to shield the
Jewish  minority  from  Danish  Nazis  at  a  time  when  anti-Semitism  was  rampant.  This
suggests that the decision not to prosecute can also be seen as a political rather than purely
legal decision.138 
The Danish cartoon controversy highlights the importance of the broader context in which
the cartoons were published. The discourse on free speech shows the marginalisation of a
minority and their (partial) exclusion from the discourse on a matter of crucial importance for
them: the image of Islam and Muslims and, in a larger sense, the role of religion within the
society.  This  clearly  demonstrates  the power  relations  within  the Danish  society  and  in
particular the power of the majority to express whatever view about a minority. The question
that arises is whether the public discourse on free speech in France and the role of French
Muslims in this debate can reveal their socio-political situation in France. 
The next chapter will analyse the public discourse on free speech in France after the attack
on Charlie Hebdo in January 2015. 
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29
Discourse Analysis 
As outlined in the chapter on methodology, this chapter will analyse the public discourse in
France and the role of French Muslims in this discourse using the 3-step approach of Senem
Aydın-Düzgit. 
The discourse topics
The general discourse about ‘free speech’ deals with the role, importance and meaning of
free speech in a democratic society, the limits of free speech and its interaction with other
rights (mainly religious freedom). These overlying issues can be found in both discourse
topics. The discourse on free speech can be grouped into two different topics: the attack, the
journal Charlie Hebdo.
The first  topic around the ‘attack’ centres around questions such as: Who committed the
attack? Who was/were the victim(s)? What was the reason of the attack? What does the
attack mean for France, the West and its values? What effect, which consequences will the
attack have? What are the responses to the attack? To what extend is there a link between
religion and the attack and religion and violent extremism in the broader sense?
The second discourse topic  around  ‘Charlie  Hebdo’ discusses the following:  What  does
Charlie stand for? What are Charlie’s values? What is its history? What does it mean to ‘be
Charlie’? Is Charlie obsessed with Islam and Muhammad? What is the perceived role of the
cartoonists? What are the public reactions to Charlie’s covers? What role does political satire
play  in  France?  What  is  the  relationship  between  freedom  of  religion  and  freedom  of
speech? Is religion a threat to free speech?
The discourse ‘attack’
The subjects 
The first  discourse topic on the ‘attack’ has three main subjects: ‘attack’,  ‘attackers’ and
‘victim(s)’, with the victims further subdivided into France and cartoonists. Charlie can in the
broader sense also seen as a subject, seeing that the cartoonists also represented Charlie's
editorial policy. As Charlie is the main subject in the second discourse I will not discuss it as
a subject but rather argue that the references made regarding the cartoonists indirectly also
refer back to Charlie itself.
The attack is being linguistically referred to as ‘attentat(s)’, ‘attaque’, ‘meurtres’, ‘tuerie(s)’,
‘terreur’,  ‘violence’,  ‘terrorisme’,  ‘assassinat’,  ‘agression’,  ‘prises  d’otages’,  ‘épreuve’,
‘tragédie’, ‘infamie’ and ‘meurtres de civils’. Describing the attack as ‘meurtre’, ‘assassinat’
and ‘agression’ already comprises a moral judgement, as the person who committed this
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attack  is  considered  as  a  criminal.  ‘Violence’,  ‘terreur’,  ‘tragédie’ are  other  examples  of
stressing the negative nature of the attack. The negative framing of the attack becomes even
more evident as every participant strongly condemns the subject139 and expresses negative
emotions such as being ‘horrified’ and ‘devastated’ 140 as for example the NGO Mouvement
contre le  racisme et  pour  l'amitié entre  les peuples (MRAP). The negative attribution of
qualities  continues  as  participants  describe  the  attack  as  ‘ignoble’  ‘barbaric’,  ‘appalling’
‘despicable’ criminal ‘cowardly’ ‘the most shocking’ and ‘godless’.141
The attack is argued to be an important turning point, giving it great historic significance.142
The same applies to the attackers, who are indirectly already being judged as criminals and
outsiders by the negative references to the act they are perpetrators of. In the texts they are
referred to as ‘extremists’ ‘fanatic or intolerant spirits’ ‘fanatics’ ‘assassins’ ‘killers’ ‘mad men’
and ‘black sheep’ 143. La Maison Islamo-Chrétienne describes them as despicable men and
argues that they were the ones committing blasphemy, not Charlie.144 They are ‘authors of
this infamy’ ‘not enlightened’, ‘fanatics’, ‘cowardly’, ‘Islamist’ and ‘dangerous’.145 Interesting is
the  choice  of  words  when  talking  about  the  death  of  the  attackers  during  the  police
operations.  ‘Neutralising  the  terrorists,  the  ones  who  have  killed’  146,  reads  an  official
government  statement.  Both  sides  have  killed  but  using  a  stronger  expression  for  the
attackers’ actions, shows that their death is perceived as something necessary and that the
government seeks to justify their deaths. 
The third main subject are the victims of the attack, in particular the cartoonists and France.
They are referred to as ‘victims’ but also as ‘innocent’ 147. The reference innocent already
suggests a positive portrayal of this group of people.
Especially the killed cartoonists receive special recognition, being described as ‘courageous’
‘extremely talented’, characterised by insolent behaviour and as ‘free thinkers’148. From the
official channels they are built up into heroes who died for their convictions and became
martyrs of free speech.149 Religious organisations as well  as NGOs seem to refrain from
celebrating them as heroes, and instead draw attention to other, equally important, values of
the République, such as tolerance, respect but also the fight against racism, Islamophobia
and confusing Muslims with the attackers.
139 Examples: ‘condamne de la manière la plus ferme’, UOIF #3; ‘avec la plus grande détermination’, 
CFCM #3.
140‘horrifié’, MRAP #6; ‘bouleversé’, MRAP #6.
141‘ignoble’, MRAP #6; ‘barbare’, Ennour #1; ‘effroyable’, UOIF #3; ‘abjectes’, UOIF #3; ‘criminelle’, 
UOIF #4l ‘lâche’, Statement #2; ‘le plus choquantes, Le Monde #11; ‘vide de Dieu’, Le Figaro #3.
142 ‘Plus que jamais, rien ne sera plus comme avant’, CFCM #4.
143‘extrémistes’, Le Monde #11, Shwaki Allam, quote of mufti of Egypt; ‘esprits intolérants ou 
fanatiques’, Le Monde #3; ‘fanatiques’, MRAP #4; ‘assassins’, Le Figaro #1; ‘tueurs’, Le Figaro #1; 
‘fous’, Le Figaro #3, quote of Benali; ‘brebis galeuses’, Le Figaro #3, quote of Benali. 
144 ‘hommes assez lâches’, La Maison Islamo-Chrétienne #1; ‘On fait injure à Dieu en donnant la mort
au Nom de Celui en qui nous reconnaissons la source de vie.’, La Maison Islamo-Chrétienne #1.
145‘auteurs de cette infamie’, Statement #2; illuminés’, Statement #1; ‘fanatiques’, Statement #1;  
‘lâche assassins’, Le Figaro #1; ‘tueurs islamistes’, Le Figaro #1; ‘dangereux’, Le Figaro #3, quote of 
Benali. 
146 ‘neutraliser les terroristes, ceux qui avaient assassiné’, Statement #1.
147 ‘victimes’, UOIF #5; ‘innocentes’, UOIF #3.
148‘chroniqueurs courageux’, Statement #2; ‘dessinateurs de grand talents’, Statement #2; ‘marqué 
par leur insolence’, Statement #2; ‘libres penseurs de la société’, Le Figaro #2. 
149 ‘morts pour l’idée qu’ils se faisaient de la France, c’est-à-dire la liberté d’expression, l’idéal de 
justice et de paix’, Statement #2.
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France, linguistically referred to as ‘la France’ or ‘la République’, can be seen as another
victim of  the attack  as Hollande appropriately  stated:  France has been attacked.150 The
attack is an attack on free speech and France at the same time as free speech is a core
value of the French republic151 and the country is seen as a role model, actively promoting
free speech in the world.152 Many positive traits and features are attributed to the Republic
such as being a place of culture, of democracy, a place embracing pluralism and stimulating
the creation of new ideas, a hub so to say.153 France’s ‘heroes’ are the cartoonists, a subject
very positively portrayed, emphasising that France is a country that produces great people.
They are already seen as part of France’s cultural heritage, also from a Muslim point of
view.154 However some are voicing concerns about this identification of France and French
people with such a controversial journal, a journal most French have not even read before
the attack.155 This, critics argue, might endanger the country’s diversity, something France
supposedly stands for.156 In this context, Muslim representatives point out existing problems
in  France such  as  Islamophobia,  racism and discrimination.  'France is  an Islamophobic
society’ quotes  Le  Monde  a French  Muslim and deliberately  chooses  to end  one of  its
articles with this quote.157
In light of the threat, the impending danger, the upcoming 'war', the strong points of France
are uttered. France is united and this national  unity is seen as the best weapon France
possesses to emerge victorious in this struggle.158 There is no doubt that France is going to
emerge victorious, after all throughout her history it always did.159
It is in memory of the victims160 and in support of their families that several organisations call
on the French people to participate in the march.161 However participation in the march is
also seen as a way to distance themselves from the attack and the attackers and to confirm
their  position as part  of  the ingroup.  Participating in the march means showing national
cohesion162 but also attachment to the French state and French values such as liberty and
fraternity.163 Some NGOs, for example MRAP criticise the presence of certain politicians at
the march, notably Benjamin Netanyahu, Avigdor Lieberman calling it an insult to the killed
journalists who were always fighting all sorts of fascism164 and a sad comedy of France’s
interior politics.165
150 See Statement #1 and Statement #2.
151 ‘La République, c’est la liberté d’expression.’, Statement #2.
152 ‘La France porte la liberté d’expression partout’, Government #2.
153 ‘La République, c’est la culture, c’est la création, c’est le pluralisme, c’est la démocratie’, 
Statement #2.
154 'Cabu, c’est notre jeunesse, c’est notre patrimoine’, Le Monde #14.
155 ‘devenir supportrice d’un journal qu’elle n’avait jamais lu, Le Figaro #6.
156 ‘la “diversité” est apparue bien absente’, Le Figaro #6.
157 ‘La France est une société islamophobe’, Le Monde #14.
158 ‘Notre meilleure arme, c’est notre unité’, Statement #2.
159 ‘La France a toujours vaincu ses ennemis’, Statement #2.
160 ‘à la mémoire des victimes’, UOIF #5; ‘hommage aux victims’, MRAP #1.
161‘en soutien à leurs familles’, UOIF #5; ‘rejoindre massivement la manifestation’, CFCM #2.
162 ‘pour l’unité et la cohésion nationale’, UOIF #5.
163 ‘pour appeler haut et fort à la vie, à la liberté, à la fraternité’, UOIF #5, ‘affirmer leur désir de vivre 
ensemble en paix dans le respect des valeurs de la République’, CFCM #2, ‘en défense de nos 
liberté’, MRAP #1.
164 ‘insulte aux journalistes de Charlie qui ont toujours combattu tous les fascismes qu’ils soient 
nationalistes ou religieux’, MRAP #3.
165 ‘triste comédie de la politique interne’, MRAP #1.
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Creation of an ingroup and outgroup 
Through references and attribution of  qualities to people and groups an ingroup and an
outgroup is being created. The ingroup is very positively portrayed, whereas the outgroup is
depicted  in  a  rather  negative  way.  The  ingroup  comprises  the  victims  (France,  Charlie
Hebdo, the cartoonists) and everybody who identifies with the values these subjects stand
for.  The  outgroup  consists  of  the  attackers  and  groups,  organisations  and  individuals
identifying with their ideologies and justifying their actions.
Flag and stigma words help to reinforce the positive or negative image of these two groups
as the reader is automatically associating the negative connotation of the stigma word with
the outgroup on the one side and the positive connotation of the flag word with the ingroup
on  the  other  side.  Flag  words  are  ‘liberty’  (‘liberté’),  solidarity  (‘solidarité),  ‘fundamental
values’ (‘valeurs fondamentales’), ‘democracy’ (‘démocratie’), ‘republic’ (‘république’), ‘unity’
(‘unité’), ‘fraternity’ (‘fraternité’), ‘life’ (‘vie’), ‘peace’ (‘paix’), ‘dignity’ (‘dignité), ‘living-together’
(‘vivre-ensemble’),  ‘respect’  (‘respect’),  ‘justice’  (‘justice),   ‘(peaceful)  coexistence’
(‘convivialité), ‘humanity’ (‘humanité), ‘reason’ (‘raison), ‘courage’ (‘courage’) and ‘suffering’
(‘souffrance’). 
I deliberately put ‘suffering’ in the pot of the flag words as it is an expression made by La
Maison Islamo-Chrétienne and in Christianity, notably in Catholicism, ‘suffering’ has a rather
positive meaning as an unavoidable feature of human life. Men suffers on earth in exchange
for eternal paradise after death.
Stigma  words  are  ‘barbarity’  (‘barbarie’),  ‘violence’  (‘violence),  ‘hatred’  (‘haine’),
‘fundamentalism’ (‘intégrisme’,  ‘fondamentalisme’),  ‘fanaticism’ (‘fanatisme’),  ‘antisemitism’
(‘antisémitisme’),  ‘terrorism’  (‘terrorisme’),  ‘jihadism’  (‘jihadisme’),  ‘obscurantism’
(‘obscurantisme’),  ‘radicalisation’  (‘radicalisation’),  ‘intolerance’  (intolérance),  ‘hostility’
(‘hostilité), ‘radical islamism’ (‘islamisme radical’) and ‘blasphemy’ (‘blasphemy)
‘Blasphemy’, although used by the attackers (and the designated outgroup) themselves as
an accusation against the West and in this case Charlie Hebdo, is in the analysed discourse
rather  used  by  French  Muslims  to  label  the  attackers  as  part  of  the  outgroup.  They
understand killing innocent people as a form of blasphemy, as God is the source of all life,
and killing this life is interpreted as an act against God.
Some participants are actively seeking to distance themselves from this group. This applies
in particular to the representatives of Muslim organisations, which implies that they are not
naturally  seen  as  part  of  the ingroup.  The  attack  is  only  the ‘fruit  of  a  minority’166 and
‘terrorism  and  crime  do  not  have  a  religion’  167 explains  the  Union  des  organisations
islamiques de France (UOIF), adding that the great majority of French Muslims reject the
attack and violence as a whole.168 The use of the attribute ‘dignified’ (‘digne’) emphasises
the positive nature of the great majority to create an even greater distance between them
and the attackers/outgroup. The attack has been committed against ‘our democracy’169 they
argue,  stressing  that  the  attack  was  also  directed  against  themselves  and  making  the
outgroup a common enemy. The frequent use of the ‘we’ form when talking about France,
166 ‘fruit que d’une minorité, UOIF #1.
167 ‘Le terrorisme et le crime n’ont pas de religion’, UOIF #8.
168 ‘ressentent [l’offense] de façon digne’, ‘rejettent la violence’, UOIF #1.
169‘contre notre démocratie’, UOIF #3.
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the attack and French values170 and also victims being described as ‘compatriots’171 signals
the wish of the French Muslim population to be seen as part of the ingroup. ‘Don’t touch my
country’172 becomes a slogan supported by them. They point out to the symbolic fact that
during  the  attack  on  Charlie  Hebdo,  two  Muslims  died  together  with  their  non-Muslim
compatriots.173 Multiple French values such as ‘liberty’, ‘fraternity’ ‘democracy’ are invoked to
show attachment to these values and confirm their role within the French society. At times
this attachment is openly addressed.174 Muslim representatives call on their population to be
active and speak out against terrorism.175 It is an ‘usurpation of  religion’176  they say and that
French Muslims will continue to fight against the confusion of terrorism and Islam.177
NGOs also contribute in establishing French Muslims as part of the ingroup by refusing all
mentions of an ‘enemy from within’ 178 and the government who make it clear that for them
the attackers have nothing to do with the religion of Islam.179
Another strategy is using pairs to highlight the difference between the two groups. ‘Intolerant
or  fanatic spirits’180 on the one side and ‘free,  open and tolerant  spirits’181 on the other,
‘extremists of drawing’182 against ‘religious extremists’183. 
Some NGOs such as MRAP also consider certain politicians as outsiders and part of the
outgroup  such  as  Benjamin  Netanyahu,  Naftali  Bennet,  Petro  Poroshenko  or  Avigdor
Lieberman, whose presence at the march they strongly condemn. They are portrayed in a
very negative way as enemies of free speech and criminals who committed crimes against
humanity184, something also the attackers are accused of.185
Topoi of culture, history and threat 
This discourse is concerned about reinforcing national identities by using the topos of 
culture, history, threat and war. Characteristic for this narrative of a threat or a war is the 
frequent use of the “we” form. The French government takes the first step by introducing a 
threat, a common enemy one has to beat, a narrative that is being picked up by most 
participants. First of all France as a country sees itself attacked186, but also their values and 
the things they stand for, such as free speech.187 Many references to the defence of free 
170 3x ‘notre pays’ in UOIF #6; ‘notre cohésion nationale’, UOIF #6; ‘notre histoire nationale’, CFCM 
#4; ‘notre 11-Septembre’, Le Monde #14, quote of Amar Lasfar.
171 2 x ‘compatriots’ in CFCM #2.
172 ‘Touche pas à mon pays’, Le Monde #14.
173 ‘le sang musulman soit versé en même temps que le sang de la Nation’, Le Figaro #10.
174 ‘attachement sans faille à la liberté d’expression et leur défense’, UOIF #7.
175 See for example CFCM #3.
176 ‘il s’agit d’usurpation de notre religion’, Le Monde #14.
177 ‘Les musulmans de France luttent contre l’amalgame entre terrorisme et islam’, Le Monde #14.
178 ‘refuser avec force [...] toutes mentions intolérables de “l’ennemie de l’intérieur”’, MRAP #5.
179 ‘n’ont rien à voir avec la religion musulmane’, Statement #1.
180 ‘esprits intolérants ou fanatiques’, Le Monde #3.
181 ‘esprits libres, ouverts et tolérants’, Le Monde #3.
182 ‘extrémistes du dessin’, Le Figaro #4
183 ‘extrémistes de la religion’, Le Figaro #4.
184 ‘Votre place n’est pas dans la Marche citoyenne de Paris mais devant les tribunaux 
internationaux’, MRAP #3.
185 ‘le meurtre de civils est un crime contre l’humanité’, Le Monde #11, quote of Grand Mufti
186 ‘La France a été attaquée’, Statement #1; ‘La France toute entière qui a été agressée’, Statement 
#2.
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speech188, of fundamental values, of human rights189, of ideas190 and the call to be vigilant191 
indicate that there is a serious threat. The dead journalists were allegedly fighting for free 
speech192 and participating in the march to honour the victims also means standing up for 
values such as free speech and defending them.193
The common enemy is made quite clear: terrorism, fundamentalism194, radical Islamism195, 
radicalisation196, fanaticism, obscurantism and extremism 197. The attackers of Charlie Hebdo
are representatives of this overarching enemy.
The narrative is active, calling for action by using active verbs. ‘France acts’198 is repeated 
twice in one single text to stress a France who reacts to events. Also citizens are addressed 
directly by stressing that it is necessary to combat, to fight, to tackle, to address the enemy, 
referred to by its different forms of appearance.199 War like language is used to encourage 
the people to take up arms200 and to not let themselves be intimidated.201 France has always
been able to beat its enemies is being argued through the official channel202 and liberty will 
always be stronger than barbarism203. Descriptions of the two groups confronting each other 
also reminds of a war-like situation: a ‘front line’.204
The analysed Muslim organisations however seemed to be reluctant to adopt the same 
vehement narrative on this war. Although they clearly positioned themselves on the French 
side, calling the attack an attack on free speech, on democracy, on liberty and that these 
values should be defended205, they refrain from using active words such as combating or 
fighting when talking about terrorism, fundamentalism, radical Islamism. They prefer to reject
it206 and fight the attackers themselves, rather than the general ‘enemy’.207 One comparison 
is made in an article by Shawki Allam in Le Monde to the fight against terrorism in Egypt, 
187 ‘S’attaquer à la liberté de la presse et aux journalistes qui la font vivre, c’est s’attaquer à la 
démocratie, aux valeurs fondamentales de la République’, MRAP #6; ‘attaque contre la démocratie
et la liberté de press’, CFCM #3.
188 ‘défendre la liberté d’expression’, Statement #2, Le Monde #21 and Le Figaro #6; ‘défense de la 
liberté d’expression’, Le Figaro #5 and Le Figaro #22; ‘protéger la liberté d’expression’, Le Figaro 
#11.
189  ‘la défense des droits de l’hommes’, MRAP #2.
190 ‘nous défendonds nos idées’, Government #2.
191 ‘nous devons être vigilantes’, Statement #1.
192 ‘milite pour la liberté d’expression, Le Monde #20.
193 ‘en défense de nos libertés’, MRAP #1.
194 ‘lutter contre le terrorisme et le fondamentalisme’, Statement #2.
195 ‘nous combattons le djihado-terrorisme et l’islamisme radical’, Government #2.
196 ‘lutte contre la radicalisation’, CFCM #1.
197 ‘contre le fanatisme et l’obscurantisme’, Le Monde #3 ; ‘combattre l’extrémisme’, Le Figaro #15.
198 ‘La France a fait face’, Statement #1.
199 ‘Toute croyance, dès lors qu’elle exprime le fanatisme, l’intolérance, doit être combattue.’, Le 
Monde #2.
200 ‘l’unité [...] est notre meilleure arme’, Statement #1.
201 ‘Nous sommes un peuple libre, qui ne cède à aucune pression, qui n’a pas peur’, Statement #1.
202 ‘La France a toujours vaincu ses ennemis’, Statement #2.
203 ‘Liberté sera toujours plus forte que la barbarie’, Statement #2.
204 ‘La ligne de front ne passe pas entre les croyants et les incroyants. [...]: elle passe entre les esprits
libres, ouverts et tolérants, qu’ils aient ou non une religion, et les esprits intolérants ou fanatiques, 
quel que soit le Dieu dont ils se réclament et quand bien même ils seraient athées.’, Le Monde #3.
205 ‘attachement sans faille à la liberté d’expression et leur défense’, UOIF #7.
206 ‘rejeter la violence et le terrorisme’, UOIF #6.
207 ‘combattre ces criminels et ces actes extrêmes’, Le Figaro #3, quote of Benali.
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pointing out that the Muslim community experiences the same struggle and has the same 
enemy.208
They however seem to create their own topos of fear, namely rising Islamophobia209 and 
increasing violence against Muslims210. In most texts they refer to attacks against Muslims 
and Muslim places of worship and culture as an effect of the attack on Charlie Hebdo. Just 
as they condemn the latter, they condemn these anti-Muslim acts vehemently using similar 
wording to refer to these incidents as well as attribute qualities to them.211 For these issues 
they use more active language, stressing that Islamophobia should be ‘firmly combatted’212  
and radicalisation fought against.213 Confusion between terrorism and Islam is an often 
occurring problem that needs to be touched214 and CFCM announces in their statements 
concrete actions to tackle radicalisation of Muslims in order to set an example and portray 
themselves as proactive before calling on politicians to (re)act to anti-Muslim behaviour and 
stigma in France.
The topos of culture and of history is another way of reinforcing the national identity by 
referring to common values and ideas as being united is key in times of a threat, of ‘war’. 
This topos is especially invoked by the official side through references to the culture of 
democracy of the republic215,  values fought for during its history (liberty, fraternity, equality), 
France’s national history216 and cultural heritage. However there appears to be a hierarchy 
regarding the three well known French values. Liberty and fraternity are frequently invoked 
by all participants, while equality merely gets recognition. This indirectly paints a picture of 
France as a country with unequal opportunities, with an unequal society. The famous writer 
Voltaire and his work is unquestionably seen as cultural heritage in the ‘country of Voltaire’217
where the Voltarian spirit is as present as ever218. Interestingly Heinrich Heine, by referring 
to one of his famous quotes219, seems to be part of this cultural heritage, suggesting that the 
ingroup might be bigger than just France and encompasses the whole of West Europe, or 
even the Western world. But also the cartoonists and indirectly Charlie Hebdo seem to have 
become part of France’s national heritage. Again, Muslim organisations tend to use this 
topos less frequently and less vehemently.
208 ‘lutte contre terrorisme en Egypte’, Le Monde #11.
209 ‘montée de l’islamophobia’, UOIF #2, CFCM #1; ‘climat d’islamophobia’, CFCM #4.
210 ‘craint une escalation de la violence envers les musulmans’, UOIF #2.
211 ‘actes ignobles et criminels’, UOIF #2; ‘inacceptable’, UOIF #2; ‘terrorisme’, UOIF #8.
212 ‘combattues fermement’, UOIF #8.
213 ‘lutte contre la radicalisation’, CFCM #1.
214 ‘Les musulmans de France luttent contre l’amalgame entre terrorisme et l’islam’, Le Monde #14.
215 ‘valeurs fondamentales de la République’, MRAP #4.
216 ‘notre histoire nationale’, CFCM #4.
217 ‘pays de Voltaire’, Le Figaro #8.
218 ‘esprit voltarien’, Le Figaro #22.
219 ‘Là où on brûle les livres, on brûle les hommes’, MRAP #6.
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The discourse ‘Charlie Hebdo’
The subjects 
The discourse on the journal Charlie Hebdo itself is closely linked to the discourse on the
attack.  There are  however  some crucial  differences.  First,  Charlie  is  not  victimised,  but
rather an active agent fighting for free speech. Second the discourse is not timely limited to
the attack but encompasses the time between the attack and now. Four subjects can be
identified: the journal Charlie Hebdo itself, the slogan “Je suis Charlie”, political satire and
the covers of Charlie after the attack. Even though the cartoonists can be seen as a fifth
subject, they will not be discussed in this discourse for two reasons: first, compared to the
other subjects, they receive much less attention, and second, the discourse on the attack
already treats them in a very extensive manner, deviating little from the few references made
in this discourse.
The first subject ‘Charlie Hebdo’ is also referred to as ‘esprit Charlie Hebdo’, ‘esprit Charlie’,
‘journal’ and ‘hebdomadaire’. Overall, neutral references.
Features attributed to the newspaper are both positive and negative in nature, suggesting
that the public opinion in France is divided regarding its opinion on the newspaper. First it is
described as a satirical (‘satirique’) and humoristic (‘humoristique’) newspaper. It embodies,
according  to  Jack  Lang,  director  of  the  Institut  du  monde  arabe (IMA),  among  others,
‘humour’, ‘finesse’ and ‘tenderness’220. 
The journal  is  being  accredited for  its  fight  against  racism,  political  as  well  as  religious
obscurantism,  for  being  ‘anti-militarist’  and  ‘anti-colonialist’  during  the  Algerian  war.221
Fighting  racism,  Islamophobia,  stigmatisation  is  also  something  the  newspaper  itself
stresses on various occasions, leading to the “Freedom of Expression Courage award” by
the PEN American Center as a ‘compensation for their courage’.222
The fact that some of its cartoons sparked widespread outcry is being relativized as the job
of a satirical newspaper is seen to provoke223 and one cannot expect a satirical newspaper
to respect manners, says philosopher André Comte-Sponville in an interview.224 Politicians
seem to agree with this perception as Fleur Pellerin is being quoted in an official statement
saying  that  ‘Charlie,  that  is  insolence  set  up  by  virtue  and  bad  taste  as  a  principle  of
elegance’.225 ‘It is their job to be provocative’, says Benoist Apparu.226 Charlie is against all
kinds  of  symbols,  which  includes  football  heroes  but  also  religious  figures  such  as
Muhammad, so Biard.227 A sociological study, published in Le Monde, analysing Charlie’s
220 ‘Charlie Hebdo incarne la rue, l’humour, la drôlerie, la tendresse.’, Le Monde #17.
221 ‘antimilitariste et anticolonialiste’, Le Monde #21. 
222 ‘reçoivent une récompense pour leur courage’, Le Monde #8.
223 See Statement #1.
224 ‘On ne va pas demander à un journal satirique et humoristique de respecter les bonnes 
manières!’, Le Monde #3.
225 ‘Charlie, c’est l’insolence érigé en vertu et le mauvais goût en principe d’élégance’, Government 
#1.
226 ‘C’est l’ADN de Charlie de provoquer’, Le Figaro #18.
227 ‘Mahomet est un symbole. À Charlie, nous somme contre les icônes, de la même manière que 
nous somme contre le foot!’, Le Monde #13.
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covers  seems  to  prove  them  right:  ‘No,  Charlie  Hebdo  is  not  obsessed  with  Islam’,  it
concludes.228
The attack draws attention to the previously unknown journal, both in France and abroad,
making Charlie a national  but also worldwide symbol for free speech.229 All  of  a sudden
Charlie and its message is omnipresent, so Michel Fize, sociologist and consultant.230
From abroad Charlie seemed to be something that  connects the French people,  a topic
everybody seemed to have an opinion about. “Charlie  crossed the Atlantic”231,  writes Le
Monde, hinting that Charlie did not only gain popularity, but also initiated a debate in North
America on free speech and its limits and on whether or not to reprint Charlie’s cartoons.232
The effect of this development was that Charlie seemed to stand for France and the French
society.233
At the same time Charlie has never been, so Dominique Wolton, a journal loved by everyone
in France. Its content was always known as something that divides the French opinion.234
Throughout its history, the journal faced accusations such as being racist, ‘anti-Arab’, ‘anti-
Maghreb’, ‘anticlerical’, having bad taste and a lack of respect and abusing free speech.235 
The blogger Joseph Juncker attacks Charlie for demanding free speech for itself  without
contributing to the public debate in a constructive manner.236 The question that remains here
is however, to what extend the right to exercise free speech is and should be linked with the
content itself. Does every utterance have to be useful for society and a contribution to the
search for truth?
This division among public opinion becomes especially apparent when PEN announces that
their decision to award Charlie with the “Freedom of Expression Courage award”. Several
writers published an open letter on the website The Intercept voicing their disagreement with
the  decision  to  present  the  price  to  a  journal,  whose content  is  offensive  and stirs  up
Islamophobia, anti-Arab and anti-Maghreb feelings, already present in the Western world.237
The response,  coming  from Charlie  itself  as  well  as  other  prominent  supporters  of  the
journal,  talks about a misunderstanding238 because most writers and other  public figures
abroad have not heard about the journal before the attack and have done little research to
228 ‘Non, Charlie Hebdo n’est pas obsédé par l’islam’, Le Monde #15.
229 ‘un symbole mondial de la liberté d’expression’, Le Monde #11.
230 ‘On le voit chacque matin sur les réseaux sociaux. On le voit dans une certaine presse, qui se 
flatte de tout dire, à n’importe qui, tout le temps’, Le Monde #2.
231 ‘Charlie a traversé l’Atlantique’, Le Monde #6.
232  See Le Monde #6.
233 ‘une vision de la société française’, Le Monde #6.
234 ‘Charlie n’a jamais été un journal très apprécié, il a toujours divisé, ce n’était pas un journal très 
populaire.’ Le Figaro #22;  see also ‘Charlie divise’, Le Monde #1.
235 ‘anti-arabe’, Le Monde #8; ‘anti-Maghreb’, Le Monde #8; ‘anticléricale’, Le Figaro #4;  ‘mauvais 
goût’, Le Figaro #11; ‘manque de respect’, Le Figaro #11; ‘abus de la liberté d’expression’, Le Figaro 
#11.
236 ‘revendiquer la liberté d’expression pour elle-même sans volonté de réaliser quoi que ce soit de 
constructif’, Le Figaro #14.
237 [un journal qui/a journal that] ‘valorise un contenu offensant: un contenu qui attise les sentiments 
anti-Islam, anti-Maghreb, anti-arabe qui sont déjà courants dans le monde occidental’, Le Monde 
#8.
238 ‘Je crois qu’il y a un petit malentendu’, Le Monde #13, Gérard Biard, Charlie Hebdo; ‘Ces 
polémiques sont le fruit de la méconnaissance de la véritable nature de ce journal...il est important
de la comprendre pour ne pas tuer une seconde fois ceux qui sont décédés le 7 janvier’, Le 
Monde #8, quote of Dominique Sopo, SOS Racisme.
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learn  about  its  history  and  values  since,  so  Alan  Mabanckou,  writer  and  professor  of
literature at UCLA.239 Biard makes the bold claim that Charlie has never published racist
cartoons, in fact, Charlie, so Biard, has always been anti-racist.240 Also Suzanne Nossel,
director of PEN American Center justifies the decision of her organisation by arguing that not
the content has been praised but the courage of the writers despite various death threats.241
As Charlie is since the attack well known abroad, negative traits of Charlie are reflected on
France as a whole. Studying the phenomenon of Charlie compares to studying France.242
The next subject, the slogan is either referred to as “le slogan” or “Je suis Charlie”. Right
after  the  attacks  the  slogan  seemed  to  (almost)  unanimously  mean  for  French  people
positive attributes such as ‘solidarity’ defence of free speech and democracy, ‘rejection of the
‘Other’’, ‘refusal of a scapegoat’ ‘refusal of mix-up and hate’ and ‘refusal of a “Patriotic Act”
contrary to the values of the republic’.243  People all over the world were using the slogan to
identify with the newspaper,  to express solidarity,  to take action and show that  they are
united in their  response to the attack.244 ‘Let’s stay Charlie’,  let’s not forget what Charlie
stands for,  let’s  continue to  fight  for  these values reminds MRAP the French people.245
However public opinion appears to have shifted, notably after controversial covers of Charlie
and in particular the cover one year after the attack. More and more writers, academics,
artists  and  even politicians voiced  their  concerns  with  the unconditional  defence of  free
speech the slogan seemed to imply. The danger, according to many, was that France was
identifying itself with a journal controversial since its inception and that Charlie and France
emerged as one and the same246. ‘Since when is an offensive cartoon a sign of respect and
democratic life’,  asks philosopher Thibaud Collin.247 And Manuel Valls is being quoted as
saying that “Je suis Charlie” is not the only message France has for the world. He indirectly
implies that  France also  stands  for  values  such as respect,  tolerance,  peace,  dialogue,
justice etc.248 These words were echoed by Alain Juppé249 and Isabelle Balkany.250 So on the
one side the criticism regarding the use of the slogan is directed at Charlie itself, at their
behaviour  and  actions  after  the  attack  (mainly  covers)  but  also  on  the  people  and
239 ‘Beaucoup d’écrivains signataires ont découvert Charlie Hebdo au moment des attentats. Certains 
n’ont pas vraiment cherché à savoir ce qu’il y avait derrière’, Le Monde #8.
240 ‘Nous n’avons jamais publié de dessins racistes...historiquement, nous somme un journal anti-
raciste, c’est dans notre ADN.’, Le Monde #13.
241 ‘La rédaction de Charlie Hebdo est récompensée pour son courage, par pour la qualité de ses 
dessins’, Le Monde #8.
242 ‘Au fond, ce n’est pas Charlie qui n’obtient pas toujours le bénéfice du doute sur son caractère 
antiraciste, c’est la France elle-même. A l’étranger, examiner Charlie revient à examiner la France’,
Le Monde #1.
243 ‘solidarité, MRAP #5; ‘rejet de l’Autre’, MRAP #5; ‘refuser de boucs-émissaires’, MRAP #4; ‘refuser
l’amalgame et la haine’, MRAP #5; ‘refuser un “Patriot Act” contraire aux valeurs de la République’, 
MRAP #5. 
244 ‘Certes, l’émotion est pour beaucoup dans l’adoption d’un tel slogan: le besoin de faire un geste, 
de prendre position, de sortir de la passivité à laquelle nous réduit la violence des attentats’, Le 
Figaro #1.
245 ‘Restons Charlie’, MRAP #5. 
246 ‘Charlie, c’est la France’, ‘la France, c’est Charlie’, Le Figaro #1; ‘représenter le peuple français 
comme s’identifiant au journal satirique’, Le Figaro #1.
247 ‘Depuis quand, en effet, un “dessin-insulte” est-il un signe de respect et de vie commune 
démocratique?’, Le Figaro #1.
248 ‘Il ne faut pas réduire la France à un seul message. “Je suis Charlie” n’est pas le seul message de 
la France au monde’, Government #2.
249 ‘Quand j’ouvre Charlie Hebdo, je ne suis pas toujours Charlie.’, Le Figaro #18.
250 ‘Je ne suis plus Charlie’. Le Figaro #18.
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organisations using it. They are accused of appropriating Charlie, Charlie’s history and their
alleged fight for free speech. Author Michèle Tribalat gives the example of the press and
argues  that  the press  can only  declare  themselves  as  Charlie  if  they  reprint  all  of  the
cartoons that got the journalists of Charlie killed.251
The third subject are offensive cartoons and political satire. They are referred to as ‘satire
politique’ ('political  satire'),  ‘dessin(s)’ ('drawing(s)'),  ‘caricature’ ('caricature')  and ‘humour
noir’ ('black humour'). This humour is being attributed the feature of ‘a murder weapon’252 a
weapon that if it can withstand bullets, can withstand time and oblivion.253 Political satire is
perceived as an essential component of free speech and human liberties. It is a ‘right to
offend’254 and there is such a freedom as ‘freedom of the cartoon’255 It is part of  French
political discourse, speech that is worth the most protection as some scholars argue (see
chapter on classical models) as it has a ‘political dimension’.256 Many in France see it as
their duty to explain to the rest of the world the importance of satire, of black humour and
scathing  criticism  in  France.257 The  wording  ‘culture  of  political  satire’  stresses  the
importance of political satire in the French political discourse. It is seen as a French tradition
to  mock  religion  as  such,  religious  figures  and  god.258 However  there  are  also  voices
concerned  with  the  unconditional  rights  and  freedoms  associated  with  political  satire.
‘Political satire or unnecessary insult?’, asks researcher and consultant Joelle Fiss.259 Her
words are echoed by various others who stress the importance of limits of political satire,
and indirectly free speech. Historian and writer François Huguenin is admonishing not to
hide behind an alleged ‘right to humour’, but to make sure that nobody feels deeply hurt by
someone and that  everybody  feels  respected,  both being  a precondition for  dialogue.260
Author Michèle Tribalat agrees with MRAP regarding the racist nature of the Muhammad
cartoon with a turban shaped as a bomb, reprinted by Charlie Hebdo. She refers to their
comparison of  the attack as an inhuman attack on free speech and calls this cartoon a
human attack on free speech.261
The fourth and last  subject  of this discourse are two covers,  the first  right after and the
second one year after the attack. They are linguistically referred to as ‘la une’ ('front page'),
‘la caricature’ ('the caricature'), ‘le numéro spécial’ ('special edition'), ‘le numéro’ ('the issue'),
‘la couverture’ ('the cover'), ‘la publication’ ('the publication') and ‘le journal’ ('the journal'). All
the authors refer to either the first or the second cover except for one text, presenting the
outcome of a study of all Charlie Hebdo covers which researched the question if or if not
Charlie is obsessed with Islam.  From the perspective of  two sociologists,  Jean-François
251 See Le Figaro #11.
252 ‘une arme assassine’, Le Monde #7. 
253 ‘Une arme assassine: l’humour noir, qui, s’il résiste aux balles, résiste au temps et à l’oubli’, Le 
Monde #7.
254 ‘une liberté d’offenser’, Le Figaro #9.
255 ‘la liberté de caricature’, Le Figaro #21.
256 ‘Un dessin, ce n’est pas fait que pour rigoler. Cela a aussi une dimension politique, cela permet 
d’appréhender la spécificité d’une époque’, Le Monde #20, quote of Riss.
257 ‘Il faut expliquer la culture de satire politique en France’, Le Monde #1.
258 See Le Figaro #8. 
259 ‘satire politique ou de l’insulte gratuite?’, Le Monde #1.
260 ‘Ne nous cachons pas derrière le droit à l’humour. On ne peut pas rire sans blesser...Il doit faire 
son analyse critique. Pour cela, il doit dialoguer, mais pour dialoguer il est nécessaire qu’il se 
sente respecté.’, Le Figaro #6.
261 ‘l’assaut inhumain à la liberté d’expression’, Le Figaro #11; ‘un assaut humain à la liberté 
d’expression’, Le Figaro #11.
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Mignot  and  Céline  Goffette,  the  covers  are  ‘irreverent  left’,  ‘undeniably  anti-racist’  and
‘uncompromising regarding religious obscurantism’262. The reactions in the studied texts to
the  two  covers  differ  significantly.  While  the  first  one  is  received  mainly  positively  with
worries  coming  mainly  from  Muslim  representatives,  the  second  cover  arouses  harsh
criticism and few voices of open support.
Cover #1, so Dominique Wolton, semiologist and media expert, is characteristic of Charlie
Hebdo. It is a statement defending the Voltarian spirit, calling to put an end to the power of
religion that  can dictate politics, supporting a laique educational  system, demanding free
speech and refusing censorship.263 It is an expression of Charlie staying true to its values, in
particular the right to satirical cartoons.264 It is a ‘message of peace’265 due to the choice of
green  colour,  representing  nature,  fertility,  hope  and  being  a  symbol  of  arab  identity.266
Moreover  it  is  wink  addressed at  all  three monotheistic  religions267,  as  forgiveness is  a
common value to all of them. However, the cover is also attributed with negative qualities. It
is an ‘unnecessary provocation’, so the Egyptian Muslim authority, it divides Muslims and
puts them in an uncomfortable position.268 Especially Muslim representatives voiced their
lack of understanding of the cartoon and the reason Charlie Hebdo decided to publish it.
‘One can express himself  differently,  regrets Ahmet Ogras, one of  the vice-presidents of
CFCM.269 ‘The  cover  adds  fuel  to  the  flames’,  responds  Abdallah  Zekri,  high official  in
CFCM.270
Cover #2 is applauded by historian and specialist in comic strips Didier Pasamonik for its
clarity, for being an expression of freedom of thought  and for its anti-clerical nature.271 
However, more voices can now be heard criticising Charlie Hebdo’s choice. The cartoon is
an ‘evasive answer’ to the questions raised in the public debate272, it is the ‘cherry on the
cake’ and a ‘(unnecessary)  provocation’,  so blogger Joseph Juncker.273 ‘Unnecessary’ is
deliberately  put  in  brackets  by  the  author,  hinting  at  the  unnecessary  nature  of  the
provocation. The cover is the expression of the ‘unnecessary and dangerous polemic of Mr.
Riss'  [Anm.:  Riss is  the director of  Charlie Hebdo],  so sociologist  and consultant  Michel
Fize.274 The cover is declared as not funny by politician Alan Juppé275, hinting that Charlie
Hebdo  is  losing  its  support  from  the  official  side.  Also  the  Vatican  expresses  criticism
regarding the choice of Charlie Hebdo and deplores the paradox of a world obsessed with
262 ‘irrévérencieux de gauche’, Le Monde #15; ‘indéniablement antiraciste’, Le Monde #15; 
‘intransigeant face à tous les obscurantismes religieux’, Le Monde #15. 
263  ‘Le message délivré est propre à Charlie Hebdo. Empreint de conviction et de l’esprit voltairien 
défendu lors des récentes manifestations ce dimanche, qui dit halte à la religion, qui dicte sa loi 
dans le contexte politique, qui soutient l’école laïque, qui revendique la liberté d’expression et qui 
dit non à la censure.’, Le Figaro #22.
264 ‘montrer l’attachement et la fidélité aux valeurs qui ont fait Charlie Hebdo, notamment le droit à la 
caricature des prophètes’, Le Figaro #22.
265 ‘message de paix’, Le Figaro #22. 
266 See Le Figaro #22. 
267 ‘clin d’oeil fait aux trois religions monothéistes’, Le Figaro #22.
268  ‘provocation injustifiée’, Le Figaro #13; ‘divise les musulmans’, Le Figaro #13 ; ‘met les 
musulmans dans une position inconfortable’, Le Figaro #13. 
269 ‘On pouvait s’exprimer différemment’, Le Monde #18.
270 ‘Ça va mettre de l’huile sur le feu.’, Le Figaro #13.
271 ‘clarté, Le Figaro #4; ‘s’agit avant tout de la liberté de conscience’, Le Figaro #4; ‘caricature 
anticléricale’, Le Figaro #4.
272  ‘la couverture qui noie le poisson’, Le Figaro #14.
273 ‘cerise sur le gâteau’, Le Figaro #14; ‘provocation (inutile)’, Le Figaro #14. 
274  ‘polémique inutile et dangereuse de M Riss’, Le Monde #2.
275  ‘Elle ne me fait pas rire.’, Le Figaro #18.
41
political correctness but disrespectful towards god, religion and believers.276 The cartoons
hurt  the  believers  of  all  religions,  so  the  Vatican,  quoting  symbolically  the  Muslim
organisation CFCM.277
Creation of an ingroup and outgroup 
Also in this discourse there is an ingroup and an outgroup. Especially in the beginning of the
discourse in the wake of the attack the two groups were quite clearly defined. Everybody
who openly expressed their support for Charlie and identified himself/herself with Charlie can
be considered as part of the ingroup. This attachment is proclaimed through the slogan “Je
suis Charlie”. Everybody who could not identify himself/herself as “Charlie” was not accepted
as part of the group and was labelled as ‘suspicious’, as the rapper Disiz puts it.278 The same
critic has been articulated by various other agents in the discourse279. This clear distinction
between the two groups becomes more and more blurry and explanations are being brought
forward why certain people do not necessarily feel 100% Charlie. It is being stressed by, for
instance, Nicolas Cadène, general rapporteur of the Observatoire de laicité, that this does
not automatically mean that they sympathise with the attackers.280 Being openly offensive
serves  as  a  way  to  divide  the  French  into  the  ones  that  feel  indifferent  towards  the
provocation  and  those  who  feel  hurt  and  humiliated,  so  historian  and  writer  François
Huguenin.281 Interesting to note is the reaction of Muslim organisations to the two covers of
Charlie. They do express their discontent and their opinion on ridiculing the sacred, however,
they are cautious not to lose their membership in the ingroup. Their representatives carefully
point out their differences, while at the same time concede Charlie its existence, refrain from
condemning  the  newspaper  or  criticising  it  harshly  and  stress  the  difference  between
themselves  and the  attackers,  for  example though the way they chose to express  their
disagreement  with  Charlie.282 The  Catholic  Church  in  comparison  appears  to  be  less
cautious in her wording. It is interesting to note that they do quote the Muslim organisation
276  ‘Dans le choix de Charlie Hebdo, il y a le triste paradoxe d’un monde de plus en plus attentif au 
politiquement correct au point de frôler le ridicule, mais qui ne veut ni reconnaître ni respecter la foi
en Dieu de tout croyant, quelle que soit sa religion’, Le Figaro #16.
277  ‘blesse tous les croyants des diverses religions’, Le Figaro #16.
278  ‘On a utilisé la tragédie de Charlie pour faire une ligne de démarcation entre les Français...C’est 
devenu une loi! Si t’est pas Charlie, t’est suspect, mais qu’est-ce que ça veut dire?’. Le Figaro #7.
279  ‘...ceux qui avaient osé de dire “Je ne suis pas Charlie” parce que les caricatures de 
l’hebdomadaire leur semblaient irrespectueuses de la religion musulmane étaient stigmatisés 
comme symboles de prétendus “territoires perdus de la République”, Le Monde #22 ; ‘Dans les 
débats, il y avait ce fossé entre “eux”- les non-musulmans, Charlie Hebdo -, et “nous”, les 
musulmans”. Le Monde #22, quote of Isabelle Bailleul, professor in a high school in Havre.
280  ‘Dire ‘je ne suis pas Charlie’ ne veut pas nécessairement dire que l’on approuve les terroristes. En
vérité ces collégiens n’ont pas compris pourquoi ils devaient soutenir des caricatures dont ils 
avaient le sentiment qu’elles pouvaient participer de la discrimination dont ils eux-mêmes victimes 
en tant que jeunes issus des banlieues ou de confession musulmane.’, Le Figaro #20.
281  ‘Les non-respect des croyances est une manière de dresser les unes contre les autres, les rieurs 
et les indifférents contre les humilié.’, Le Figaro #6.
282  ‘Ça va mettre de l’huile sur le feu. Je ne veux pas être désobligeant avec ces journalistes mais ils 
continuent la provocation’, Le Figaro #13, quote of Abdallah Zekri; ‘Notre différend avec Charlie 
Hebdo portait sur le devin et le sacré, qui ne doivent pas être caricaturés. Mais le moyen que nous
avions utilisé (en 2011, ndlr) était celui de la voie juridique’, Le Figaro #13, quote of Amar Lasfar; 
‘Je ne condamne pas, [mais] je ne la comprends pas’, Le Monde #18, quote of Ahmet Ogras.
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CFCM in their daily, suggesting that the two religions who are supposedly at war, are in fact
on the same side.283
Topos of threat
The predominant topos is also the topos of  war, of  fight and of a threat.  It  shows many
parallels to the topos in the previous discourse. Charlie, being the main protagonist in this
fight, battles against racism and defends human rights284 among which the right to political
satire285. Their strongest weapon is their black humour, which proved to withstand bullets286.
‘The pen is stronger than the sword’, so the official words from the government287. Charlie’s
enemies, all part of the outgroup, are the terrorists, the extremists, those who attacked them
and created the threat. In their cartoons they ridicule and satirise their enemies, depicting
them as stupid, mean, yet dangerous288. Their fight is however not for everyone a heroic
battle, with some calling it a ‘crusade’, a historic battle that receives much criticism in the
present time289.
Military speech is also applied to the differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup
and the claim about some sort of conspiracy of some discourse participant. The incident has
been used, so Disiz to ‘draw a demarcation line amongst the French’, to divide them so to
say.290 François  Huguenin  agrees  and  maintains  that  disrespectful  behaviour  towards
religion is a way to set the ones that laugh against those that feel humiliated291.
It becomes clear that even though in the wake of the attack the French people seemed to be
united and express in unison their support for Charlie Hebdo, the attack also deeply divided
French society regarding the way people felt  about  the newspaper itself.  Most  critics  of
Charlie tended to be cautious with their criticism, expressing some degree of support for and
identification with Charlie Hebdo, giving the impression that it was publicly not acceptable to
voice harsh criticism.
283  See Le Figaro #16.
284 ‘la lutte contre le racisme’, MRAP #2; ‘la défense des droits de l’homme’, MRAP #2. 
285  ‘défendre la liberté de caricature attaquée par les terroristes’, Le Figaro #21.
286  ‘Une arme assassine: l’humour noir, qui, s’il résiste aux balles, résiste au temps et à l’oubli’, Le 
Monde #7.
287  ‘La plume est plus puissante que l’épée’, Government #1.
288  ‘Qu’il sont bêtes et méchants, dangereux aussi, ceux qu’ils croquent!’, Le Monde #7.
289  ‘repartir en croisade contre ce qu’il [Anm. Riss] nomme les “fanatiques” [...] et les “cul-bénis”...? 
Le Monde #2.
290  ‘On a utilisé la tragédie de Charlie pour faire une ligne de démarcation entre les Français... , Le 
Figaro #7.
291  ‘Les non-respect des croyances est une manière de dresser les unes contre les autres, les rieurs 
et les indifférents contre les humilié.’, Le Figaro #6.
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Concluding Remarks
The classical debate is exhaustive in offering explanation for the controversy  evolving the
publication of the cartoons by Charlie Hebdo as the arguments from truth, democracy and
autonomy  can offer  justifications  why  the  ideas  represented  as  cartoons  are  worth  of
protection. First,  competition on the marketplace will prove or refute their validity,  renting
governmental control unnecessary. Second, the cartoons are more than a mere expression
of art, they are political statements and receive therefore protection as forming part of the
public  discourse.  Last,  the  cartoonists  had  a  right  to  express  their  views  in  public  as
governmental interference would infringe on their autonomy. The ECtHR might have granted
France a margin of appreciation if France had decided that the cartoons were a hindrance to
public order. Yet, French legal tradition is however deeply rooted in secularism with the Court
stressing the importance of religious satire in the case concerning the republishing of the
Danish cartoons. 
As in the Danish cartoon controversy, analysing the broader socio-political context provides
a deeper understanding of the root causes of the protests following the attack. The discourse
on free speech after the attack clearly reveals the hierarchy within French society. It was the
official  side producing the discourse by choosing the wording, the meaning of  terms, the
topoi (namely the topos of threat) and creating an ingroup and an outgroup. The attack is
presented as an attack on one of France’s core values, free speech and hence on the nation
itself,  creating a threat.  References to the topoi of  culture and history create a sense of
belonging to the ingroup portrayed as the more advanced and victorious group as opposed
to the barbaric ‘Other’.  As CDL postulates,  also the analysed discourse is ideological in
nature. This is taken up by most participants in the analysed discourse demonstrating the
pressure from above and the unequal power relations. Through this not only the dominant
positions but also the present social structure and the power relations are being naturalised.
The choice of terms, meaning or topoi is only questioned by few agents in the discourse,
mainly  by  French  intellectuals,  showing  that  they  feel  more  powerful  to  stand  up  and
challenge the mainstream opinion. 
This thesis can only offer a first glimpse into the complex and wide ranging discourse on free
speech taking place after the attack on Charlie Hebdo and a more intensive research would
be beneficial to shed more light on the societal relations displayed in this discourse. 
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